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A TALE OF THREE TAKINGS:  
TAKING ANALYSIS IN LAND USE 
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 
AUSTRALIA, AND CANADA 
Donna R. Christie*
I. I DUCTION NTRO
he roots of the American, Australian, and Canadian legal systems 
spring from a common English heritage. Similarly, their concep-
tions of property draw on a common heritage, including the Magna Car-
ta1 and the writings of Blackstone2 and Locke,3 with the result that pro-
tection of property is a prominent feature of all three legal systems. 
When the government expropriates private property within these democ-
ratic societies, there is a presumption and, in some cases, a constitutional 
compulsion to compensate the owner. 
T 
Beginning in the 1920s, the U.S. Supreme Court deviated from the 
principle that compensation is only required when the government takes 
possession of or acquires a legal interest in property. In Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon,4 the Supreme Court held that regulating the use of 
property, in that case Pennsylvania Coal’s mineral rights, may also re-
quire compensation if the regulation “goes too far.”5 “Regulatory taking” 
claims did not become common, however, until the 1970s when land use 
and environmental regulation became pervasive; because these regula-
tions seriously devalued or limited the use of land, property rights advo-
cates, not only in the United States but also in Australia and Canada, be-
gan to seek more extensive protection. By the 1990s, cases in both Aus-
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 1. MAGNA CARTA (1215), available at http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/ 
featured_documents/magna_carta/translation.html. 
 2. E.g., WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765). 
 3. E.g., JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1988) (1690). 
 4. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 5. Id. at 415. 
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tralia and Canada seemed to follow Mahon’s lead by requiring compen-
sation when land use regulations seriously devalued mineral rights. 
This article surveys and compares the development of the concept of 
regulatory taking in the United States, Australia, and Canada in the con-
text of land use regulation. Part II discusses the seminal cases in the three 
countries, all coincidentally involving mineral rights. Part III examines 
the constitutional underpinnings of protection of property in the three 
countries. Finally, Part IV looks at each country’s struggle to balance 
important public interests reflected in land use and environment regula-
tion with protection of private property and to develop a consistent the-
ory of regulatory taking. 
II. THREE SEMINAL CASES 
A. The United States: Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 
The provision in the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution stating 
that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just 
compensation”6 limits the federal government’s7 “tacit . . . pre-existing 
power”8 of eminent domain by requiring that such takings of property be 
compensated.9 Prior to 1922 and the Supreme Court’s decision in Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,10 this limitation had been generally under-
stood as applying to circumstances where the government actually ap-
propriated land or ousted the private land holder.11 Justice Holmes’ de-
termination in Mahon that property might be “taken” without physical 
appropriation is credited with introducing the concept of regulatory tak-
 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 7. In addition, “the Fifth Amendment . . . applies against the States through the Four-
teenth Amendment.” San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 623 n.1 
(1981); see also Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 
(1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978); Chicago, 
Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897). 
 8. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241–42 (1946). 
 9. The so-called Takings Clause “does not prohibit the taking of private property, 
but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power.” First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987). The Fifth 
Amendment also provides that no “person . . . shall . . . be deprived of property, without 
due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 10. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 11. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (“Prior 
to Justice Holmes’ exposition . . . it was generally thought that the Takings Clause 
reached only a direct appropriation of property, or the functional equivalent of a practical 
ouster of [the owner’s] possession.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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ing12―what has been termed as “[b]y far, the most intractable constitu-
tional property issue”13 of modern American jurisprudence. 
In Mahon, the Pennsylvania Coal Company challenged the constitu-
tionality of the Kohler Act, a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting the mining 
of coal in a manner that would cause subsidence of “any structure used 
as a human habitation”14 and other structures. These included roads and 
railroads; public buildings, such as schools and hospitals; and commer-
cial buildings, such as factories and stores.15 The Mahons attempted to 
invoke the statute to prevent the coal company from mining under their 
home in a way that would remove support and cause it to sink.16 The 
landowners held the property, however, under a deed from the coal com-
pany which conveyed the surface rights, but expressly reserved the right 
to remove all the underlying coal. The deed also stated that the landown-
ers assumed the risk of subsidence and waived all claims for damages 
arising from future coal mining.17 The trial court invalidated the statute 
as unconstitutional, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the law 
as a valid exercise of the police power.18
Justice Holmes agreed with the coal company that the police power 
could not be stretched so far19 as to extinguish the existing property and 
contract rights of the company without compensation. Holmes’s often-
quoted maxim “that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, 
if a regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking”20 is far from 
self-explanatory. His less aphoristic commentary did little to clarify fur-
ther the extent to which government regulation can interfere with prop-
erty rights before compensation is required. Holmes explained as fol-
lows: 
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to 
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change 
in the general law. As long recognized some values are enjoyed under 
an implied limitation and must yield to the police power. But obviously 
the implied limitation must have its limits or the contract and due proc-
 
 12. See William Michael Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Signifi-
cance of Mahon, 86 GEO. L.J. 813, 822 (1998) (citing authorities for this conceptualiza-
tion of Mahon). 
 13. Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 
57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 561 (1984). 
 14. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413. 
 15. 1921 Pa. Laws 1198. 
 16. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See id. at 413. 
 20. Id. at 415 (emphasis added). 
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ess clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determining such 
limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magni-
tude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent 
domain and compensation to sustain the act. So the question depends 
upon the particular facts.21
While Holmes highlighted the complete diminution of value of the coal 
company’s property rights, he also considered in his analysis the weight 
to be given the public interest element of the law.22 He adjudged, how-
ever, that the public interest in “a single private house”23 was not “suffi-
cient to warrant so extensive a destruction of the defendant’s constitu-
tionally protected rights.”24 Further, in considering the general validity of 
the statute, Holmes also discounted the overall public interest in a prob-
lem created by the “short sighted[ness]” of public officials who had used 
eminent domain to acquire surface rights without a right of support.25 In 
holding that the Kohler Act was not a valid exercise of the police power, 
Holmes summed up with the reminder that “a strong public desire to im-
prove the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire 
by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.”26
Justice Brandeis’ equally famous dissent in the case focused on the pu-
bic interest aspects of the Kohler Act in preventing harm to the citizens 
of the state. Brandeis argued that legislation restricting use of land to 
protect the public health, safety, or morals from threatened harms is not a 
taking.27 Brandeis contrasted regulation intended to confer benefits on 
the public, noting that to legitimate such a restriction on individual land-
owners, a certain reciprocity of advantage might be necessary.28 “But 
where the police power is exercised, not to confer benefits upon property 
owners, but to protect the public from detriment and danger, there is . . . 
no room for considering reciprocity of advantage.”29
 
 21. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413. 
 22. Holmes paid some lip service to the judgment of the legislative body in acting in 
the public interest by stating: “The greatest weight is given to the judgment of the legisla-
ture but it is always open to interested parties to contend that the legislature has gone 
beyond its constitutional power.” Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 414. 
 25. Id. at 415. 
 26. Id. at 416. 
 27. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 28. Id. at 422. 
 29. Id. 
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B. Australia: Newcrest Mining (WA) Limited v. The Commonwealth of 
Australia30
Australia’s Constitution of 1901 in section 51(xxxi) authorizes the 
Commonwealth31 to acquire property on “just terms”32 for “any purpose 
in respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws” under that 
section.33 The Australian High Court’s Newcrest Mining decision in 
1997 has been described as “the first time under Australian law [that] 
land use restrictions have been held to constitute an acquisition of prop-
erty for which there is a constitutionally guaranteed right to compensa-
tion.”34 In the Tasmanian Dam Case,35 the High Court had previously 
articulated the rule that section 51(xxxi) and the requirement of just 
terms does not apply merely because “legislation adversely affects or 
terminates a pre-existing right that an owner enjoys in relation to his 
property” without actually effecting the acquisition of an interest in the 
property by the Commonwealth.36
In Newcrest Mining, the company held mining leases at Coronation 
Hill in the Northern Territory granted by the Commonwealth. Proclama-
tions in 1989 and 1991 made under the National Parks and Wildlife Con-
 
 30. (1997) 190 C.L.R. 513 (Austl.). 
 31. The states of Australia are not subject to the constitutional requirement to provide 
just terms. See id. at 650. 
 32. “Just terms” here differs from “just compensation” under the U.S. Constitution. In 
Nelungaloo Proprietary Ltd. v. Commonwealth, (1948) 75 C.L.R. 495 (Austl.), the High 
Court confirmed that just terms does not guarantee full compensation. Justice Dixon’s 
opinion stated that just terms “appears to refer to what is fair and just as between the 
community and the owner . . . [u]nlike ‘compensation,’ which connotes full money 
equivalence.” Id. at 569. It should be noted, however, that just terms often requires full 
compensation, and a significant number of justices on the High Court have taken the 
position that full compensation is a requirement. Tom Allen, The Acquisition of Property 
on Just Terms, 22 SYDNEY L. REV. 351, 371–75 (2000). 
 33. AUSTL. CONST. § 51(xxxi). The section specifically enumerates the areas in which 
Parliament has the “power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the 
Commonwealth.” Id. § 51. The just terms clause is a restriction on Parliament’s legisla-
tive authority in that “it forbids the making of laws with respect to the acquisition of 
property . . . on terms that are not just.” Mutual Pools & Staff Pty. Ltd. v. Common-
wealth, (1994) 179 C.L.R. 155, 169 (Austl.). By implication, section 51(xxxi) also limits 
the power of Parliament to enact laws for compulsory acquisition of property under other 
authorities, referred to as other “heads of power” in Australian jurisprudence. See id. at 
177. 
 34. Karla Sperling, Going Down the Takings Path: Private Property Rights and Pub-
lic Interest in Land Use Decision-Making, 14 ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J. 427, 431 (1997). 
 35. Commonwealth v. Tasmania (Tasmanian Dam Case), (1983) 158 C.L.R. 1 
(Austl.). 
 36. Id. at 145.  
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servation Act of 197537 had the effect of extending the Kakadu National 
Park to include land covered by a number of Newcrest Mining’s unex-
pired mineral leases. The Act had been amended in 1987 to provide: “No 
operations for the recovery of minerals shall be carried on in Kakadu 
National Park.”38 The amendments further provided that “the Common-
wealth is not liable to pay compensation to any person by reason of the 
enactment of this Act.”39 Newcrest Mining sought to have the proclama-
tions invalidated on the grounds that they constituted an acquisition of 
Newcrest’s property without provision of “just terms” as required by sec-
tion 51(xxxi) of the Constitution.40
In contrast to Holmes’ succinct opinion for the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Mahon,41 the High Court decision in Newcrest Mining consisted of seven 
separate opinions spanning over one-hundred pages. The primary focus 
of the opinions, however, was not on whether there had been an acquisi-
tion of property by the Commonwealth, but rather on the issue of 
whether section 51(xxxi) was applicable at all to the proclamations. The 
Commonwealth argued that it acted under the plenary power over the 
Northern Territory conferred by section 122 of the Constitution which 
was not qualified by the requirement of just terms.42 Four of the seven 
justices—Toohy, Gaudron, Gummow, and Kirby―found, for varying 
reasons, that section 51(xxxi) was applicable and found the proclama-
tions invalid for failure to provide just terms in respect of the acquired 
property. Dissenting Justice Brennan joined them in finding that the 
proclamations would have effected an acquisition of property requiring 
just terms if section 51(xxxi) had been applicable.43
The issue of whether the proclamations actually acquired property re-
ceived relatively little attention by the High Court. Only Justice 
McHugh, a dissenter, directly discussed the effect of the proclamations in 
terms of the Tasmanian Dam Case.44 Justice McHugh expressed no 
doubt that the mining leases were property within the purposes of section 
51(xxxi), but suggested that just terms refers not only to the payment of 
compensation, but also to the Commonwealth’s receiving some “benefit 
 
 37. National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act, 1975, c. 7(8) (Austl.). 
 38. National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Amendment Act, 1987, c. 6 (Austl.). 
 39. Id. at c. 7. 
 40. See Newcrest Mining, (1997) 190 C.L.R. at 531. 
 41. The Mahon decision is only five pages in length. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 393. 
 42. Newcrest Mining, (1997) 190 C.L.R. at 531. 
 43. Justice Brennan found that the proclamations “acquired property” from Newcrest, 
but that section 122, rather than section 51, was applicable and did not require just terms. 
Id. at 534. 
 44. Id. at 573. 
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or advantage.”45 McHugh reasoned that although Newcrest Mining’s 
right to mine was adversely affected, the Commonwealth received no 
proprietary interest in the minerals.46 Even a total extinguishment of 
Newcrest’s interest required no compensation if there was no gain by the 
Commonwealth.47 Regardless, McHugh concluded that Newcrest had not 
forfeited any property interest―its right to exploit those interests had 
been “merely . . . impinge[d]” upon by the proclamations.48
Justice Gummow49 conceded that the proclamations’ language did not 
effect a direct acquisition of property,50 but he had no difficulty conclud-
ing that the results of proclamations were not simply an extinguishment 
of a statutory privilege under a licensing system51 or “merely an impair-
ment of the bundle of rights constituting the property of Newcrest.”52 He 
stated that the Conservation Act had “the effect, as a legal and practical 
matter, of denying to Newcrest the exercise of its rights under the mining 
tenements . . . [resulting in] sterilisation of the rights constituting the 
property in question.”53 The “identifiable benefit or advantage” acquired 
by the Commonwealth did not have to be identical to what was taken 
from Newcrest.54 The benefit to the Commonwealth was not the right to 
the minerals prior to the expiration of the leases, but the ability to operate 
the park unhampered by any mineral operations by Newcrest.55
Justice Kirby agreed that the prohibition on mining operations resulted 
in an acquisition of Newcrest’s mining tenements,56 but his strong posi-
tion on the relation of the Constitution to individual property rights dis-
tinguished his opinion. Kirby categorized property as a fundamental 
right,57 and argued that the Constitution should be interpreted in a man-
 
 45. Id. See also The Tasmanian Dam Case, (1983) 158 C.L.R. at 145 (“The emphasis 
in s. 51(xxxi) is not on a ‘taking’ of private property but on the acquisition of property for 
purposes of Commonwealth.”). 
 46. Newcrest Mining, (1997) 190 C.L.R. at 573. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Justice Gummow was joined by Justices Toohey, Gaudron, and Kirby on this 
issue. 
 50. Newcrest Mining, (1997) 190 C.L.R. at 633. 
 51. Id. at 635. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 634. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Newcrest Mining, (1997) 190 C.L.R. at 639. 
 57. Id. at 658–59. 
350 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 32:2 
                                                                                                            
ner that preserves fundamental rights58 and produces a result that is not 
“manifestly unjust.”59
C. Canada: The Queen v. Tener60
Canada’s Constitution Act61 distributes power between the federal 
government and the provinces,62 and while the provinces have broad 
power to expropriate property pursuant to their authority over property 
and civil rights,63 the federal government’s power of expropriation is 
limited to taking property in relation to its specific legislative authori-
ties.64 Unlike the United States and Australia, Canada has no federal con-
stitutional provision to guarantee compensation for expropriation of 
property.65 The federal government and all the provinces and territories 
have, however, enacted land expropriation acts66 and other statutes to 
include compensation provisions. A right to compensation depends on 
whether there has been an expropriation of property within the scope of a 
specific law which provides for compensation.67
 
 58. “Where the Constitution is ambiguous, this Court should adopt the meaning 
which conforms to the principles of fundamental rights rather than an interpretation 
which would involve a departure from such rights.” Id. at 657. “Where there is an ambi-
guity in the meaning of the Constitution, as there is here, it should be resolved in favour 
of upholding such fundamental and universal rights.” Id. at 661. 
 59. Id. at 639. 
 60. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 533 (Can.). 
 61. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5 
(Appendix 1985). 
 62. Id. § 32.  
 63. See ERIC C.E. TODD, THE LAW OF EXPROPRIATION AND COMPENSATION IN CANADA 
32 (1992). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 31–32. Professor Todd notes that section 1(a) of the Canadian Bill of 
Rights, which applies only to national legislation, does recognize “the right of the indi-
vidual to . . . enjoyment of property and the right not to be deprived thereof except by due 
process of law.” Id. at 34. He states that due process, however, “seems to mean nothing 
more than ‘in accordance with the common law and statue law as it exists at any particu-
lar time.’” Id. (internal citations omitted). Further, section 2 of the Bill of Rights allows 
the Parliament, through express declaration in legislation, to infringe upon or abrogate 
rights. Id. 
 66. See Expropriation Act, R.S.C., ch. E-21 (1985) (Can.); Northwest Territories 
Expropriation Act, R.S.N.W.T., ch. E-11 (1988); Nova Scotia Expropriation Act, 
R.S.N.S., ch. 156 (1989); Ontario Expropriations Act, R.S.O., ch. E-26 (1990); Prince 
Edward Island Expropriation Act, R.S.P.E.I., ch. E-13 (1988); Quebec Expropriation Act, 
R.S.Q., ch. E-24 (1983); Saskatchewan Expropriation Act, R.S.S., ch. E-15 (1978); 
Yukon Expropriation Act, R.S.Y., ch. 81 (2002).  
 67. Further, Canadian common law provides no basis for compensation. See infra 
Part IV.C. 
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In Tener, the plaintiffs were successors in title to grants of mineral 
rights issued by the Crown in lands that in 1939 were incorporated into 
Wells Gray Provincial Park.68 Originally, Wells Gray was designated a 
Class B park, which allowed for some mining exploration and develop-
ment to continue.69 With the Park Act70 in 1965, holders of mineral 
rights were required to obtain a park use permit to exercise those rights 
within a park.71 Then in 1973, Wells Gray was upgraded to a Class A 
park,72 which under the Provincial Parks Act73 meant that park use per-
mits could be issued only when “necessary to the preservation or mainte-
nance of the recreational values of the park involved.”74 The Teners un-
successfully applied for several permits between 1974 and 1977, and 
were finally notified in 1978 that no new exploration or development 
would be allowed in the park.75 The Teners then filed suit seeking com-
pensation for acquisition of the mineral claims, past expenditures on the 
claims, and the present value of the loss of opportunity to exploit the 
minerals.76
Much of the Tener opinion is dedicated to a discussion of which act or 
acts were relevant and whether the acts provided for compensation. Jus-
tice Estey, writing for the majority of the Canadian Supreme Court,77 
reminded that there is a “longstanding presumption of a right to compen-
sation”78 and noted the principle stated in Attorney-General v. De 
Keyser’s Royal Hotel, Ltd.79 that “[u]nless the words of the statute 
clearly so demand, a statute is not to be construed so as to take away the 
property of a subject without compensation.”80 The Park Act, it was con-
cluded, provided authority for expropriation of land81 and incorporated 
 
 68. Tener, [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 553–54. 
 69. Id. at 555. 
 70. R.S.B.C., ch. 31 (1965) (Can.). 
 71. Tener, [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 554–55. 
 72. Id. at 555. 
 73. R.S.B.C., ch. 211 (1936) (Can.). In 1973, the Mineral Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 244 
(1960) (Can.), was also amended to require authorization by the Lieutenant Governor in 
Council for exploitation of mineral rights in a park. 
 74. Park Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 31 § 9(1)(a). 
 75. Tener, [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 537–38. 
 76. Id. at 538. 
 77. Justice Estey wrote for the five-member majority. The two other justices also 
concurred in the majority’s conclusions. 
 78. Tener, [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 559. 
 79. [1920] A.C. 508, 542 (H.L.) (U.K.).  
 80. Tener, [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 559; see also The Queen v. Fisherman’s Wharf Ltd., 
[1982] 144 D.L.R.3d 21, 28–33 (N.B.C.A.) (discussing the development of this principle 
in Canadian case law). 
 81. Tener, [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 559–60.  
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by reference the compensation provisions of the Ministry of Highway 
and Public Works Act.82
In determining whether there had been an expropriation, the majority 
focused on what the government had acquired through the denial of per-
mits, i.e., the benefit to the park.83 “The denial of access to these  
lands . . . amounts to a recovery by the Crown of a part of the right 
granted to the respondents in 1937. This acquisition by the Crown consti-
tutes a taking from which compensation must flow.”84 Justice Estey care-
fully distinguished this type of regulation from zoning and regulation of 
activities on land which generally will not trigger compensation.85 He 
stated that zoning and other land use regulations do not add to the value 
of public property, but that the denial of the permits did add value to the 
park and constituted an expropriation of the Teners’ interest in the land.86 
The case was therefore referred to a tribunal for determination of the 
amount of compensation. 
III. IN THE BEGINNING: PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTIONS 
A discussion of the degree to which property is recognized and re-
ceives protection may logically start with a nation’s conception of the 
role of property in its society and the extent to which property is given 
constitutional status.87 There is a rich literature on the nature of property 
and the justification for private property,88 but in the context of regula-
 
 82. Id. at 560. 
 83. Id. at 565. 
 84. Id. at 563. 
 85. Id. at 557, 564. Justice Estey noted an exception when zoning is used to “depress 
the value of property as a prelude to the compulsory taking of the property for a public 
purpose.” Id. at 557. 
 86. Id. at 565. 
 87. With a plethora of emerging democracies in the last two decades, this historical 
issue has reemerged as a issue of contemporary debate. See Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of 
World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771 (1997). 
 88. The literature is far too broad to summarize here, but for some of the most influ-
ential writings see GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING 
VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT (1997); Harold Demsetz, Toward a 
Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967); JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE 
GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
(1998); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN (1985); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555 
(1997); Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of 
Property, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1319 (1987); Frank I. Michelman, Property as a Constitu-
tional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097 (1981); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE 
PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990); Margaret Jane 
Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982); Carol Rose, Mahon Re-
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tory takings and the constitutions of the three countries discussed in this 
article, two models seem most relevant. The first model rejects the abso-
lutist notions of Blackstone89 and ascribes both private and public as-
pects to property.90 The private aspects are bound up in the concept of 
personal liberty and autonomy, while the public aspect focuses on the 
role that property serves in society.91 If government follows a classically 
republican tradition, private property is subordinate to the public inter-
est;92 liberalism, however, espouses that government exists to protect 
individual liberty and property.93 The second, related model equates 
property with power. To the extent that the right of property may limit 
 
constructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984); 
Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); 
RICHARD SCHLATTER, PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1951); William B. 
Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553 (1972); Cass R. 
Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 907 (1993); Laura S. 
Underkufller, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127 (1990). 
 89. Blackstone defined the “right of property” as “that sole and despotic dominion 
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclu-
sion of the right of any other individual in the universe.” WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COM-
MENTARIES *2. His discussions of property also included the following observations: 
The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that of property: 
which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, 
without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land . . . . So 
great moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not au-
thorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole 
community. 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *134–35. 
 90. Gregory Alexander explains that while property serves an individual function, 
“securing a zone of freedom for the individual in the realm of economic activity,” it also: 
serve[s] the public good. This conception does not so much socialise ownership 
as it conceives the ends which property is to serve as being social. . . . That is, 
property is privately owned just insofar as this serves the common welfare, 
where the common welfare is conceived as more than merely the aggregate of 
individual preference satisfaction. 
Gregory S. Alexander, Constitutionalising Property: Two Experiences, Two Dilemmas, 
in PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 88, 89–90 (Janet McLean ed., 1999) [hereinafter 
Alexander, Constitutionalising Property]. 
 91. See id. 
 92. ELY, supra note 88, at 33 (“The sacrifice of individual interests to the greater of 
the whole formed the essence of republicanism.”).  
 93. “Government . . . is instituted no less for protection of property, than for the pro-
tection of individuals.” William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Significance of the 
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 710 (1985) [here-
inafter Treanor, Origins of Just Compensation]. 
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the power of the government and the majority over individuals, property 
serves to preserve freedom and liberty.94 This need to limit government 
and safeguard property is inconsistent with republicanism’s faith in legis-
lative bodies as the “voice of the people . . . to perceive the common 
good and to define the limits of individual rights.”95 While these concep-
tions of property are not necessarily contradictory, they do create what 
Professor Carol Rose calls a “fundamental tension.”96  
The current constitutions of the United States, Australia, and Canada 
were each adopted approximately a century apart,97 giving the framers of 
the latter two not only the benefit of the prolific scholarship on property, 
but also the ability to draw upon the constitutional history of the United 
States in considering the extent to which property would receive consti-
tutional protection. Each country’s constitutional history provides some 
insights into the perceptions of the country’s Founders or Framers con-
cerning the nature of property and degree of protection it would be af-
forded in their society. 
A. The Constitutional Provisions of the United States 
Neither the first state constitutions nor the Articles of Confederation 
included a just compensation clause.98 During America’s colonial and 
revolutionary period, compensation for government appropriation of land 
 
 94. See NEDELSKY, supra note 88, at 223 (“Property set bounds between a protected 
sphere of individual freedom and the legitimate scope of government authority.”). Prop-
erty and power also come together in the realm of democratic political participation, as 
property provides the power to participate effectively in the polity. See Treanor, Origins 
of Just Compensation, supra note 93, at 699. 
 95. Treanor, Origins of Just Compensation, supra note 93, at 701. 
 96. Rose, supra note 13, at 587–92. Laura Underkuffler-Freund posits that 
“[p]roperty describes the tension between individual and collective . . . [and that] the 
tension . . . is a part of the concept of property, itself.” Laura Underkuffler-Freund, Tak-
ings and the Nature of Property, 9 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 161, 168 (1996); see also 
Gregory S. Alexander, Takings and the Post-Modern Dialectic of Property, 9 CONST. 
COMMENT. 259, 264 (1992) (discussing the incompatibility of “self-regarding” and 
“communitarian” views of property). 
 97. The United States Constitution was adopted by a constitutional convention in 
1787 and came into force in 1788; the Australian Constitution came into effect in 1901; 
Canada’s Constitution Act was adopted in 1982, but it describes the “Constitution of 
Canada” as comprising the Constitution Act, 1982 and thirty other acts and orders in-
cluded in a schedule. Constitution Act § 52(2), 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.), as re-
printed in R.S.C., No. 5 (Appendix 1985). 
 98. Expropriation without compensation in these times was common. See Treanor, 
Origins of Just Compensation, supra note 93, at 698 (“Loyalist property was seized. Un-
developed land was taken for roads. Goods of all types were impressed for military 
use.”). 
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was not a firmly entrenched principle.99 State legislatures confiscated the 
land of Loyalists, created obstacles to payment of British debts, issued 
paper money, and passed debtor relief laws.100 The insecurity of property 
rights contributed to the dislocation of economic relations and instability 
of society, and led many political leaders to call for a stronger national 
government.101
The debate in the United States leading to the 1788 Constitution di-
rectly pitted liberal conceptions against the republican values of the revo-
lutionary era.102 It had been no coincidence that the Declaration of Inde-
pendence drafted by Thomas Jefferson referred to “life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness” as “unalienable rights,”103 rejecting Locke’s well-
known formulation of “life, liberty, and property.”104 Jefferson’s republi-
can principles valued property “not as an end in itself but as a foundation 
for republican government.”105 Property was among the private interests 
that should be subordinate to the common good.106 But it was James 
Madison who set the agenda for the constitutional convention and who 
was the architect of the Bill of Rights. Jennifer Nedelsky aptly summa-
rized the Madisonian and liberal Federalist views of property as follows: 
[P]roperty was the central instance of rights at risk in a republic. It was 
property that had alerted them to the inherent vulnerability of minority 
rights in popular government, and thus property that became the focal 
point for the broader problem. And property was not just an abstract 
symbol. It was a right whose security was essential to the economic and 
political success of the new republic. If property could not be protected, 
not only prosperity, but liberty, justice, and the international strength of 
the new nation would ultimately be destroyed.107
 
 99. Id. at 695–98; see also William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of 
the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 785 (1995) [here-
inafter Treanor, Takings Clause]. But see ELY, supra note 88, at 25 (“The compensation 
principle, although recognized, was only imperfectly realized before the Revolution. Yet 
the colonists generally regarded just compensation as a fundamental principle.”). 
 100. See Treanor, Origins of Just Compensation, supra note 93, at 704. 
 101. See ELY, supra note 88, at 41. 
 102. See id. at 33–44. 
 103. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 104. See Treanor, Origins of Just Compensation, supra note 93, at 700. 
 105. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF 
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 27 (1997) [hereinafter ALEXANDER, 
COMMODITY & PROPRIETY].  
 106. NEDELSKY, supra note 88, at 29. 
 107. Id. at 6; see also ELY, supra note 88, at 42 (“Harboring little faith in the people, 
the [Federalist] framers were not democrats in any modern sense. Indeed, they viewed 
popular government as a potential threat to property rights.”). 
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Madison was unsuccessful, however, in inserting a statement of gov-
ernment’s purpose in the Constitution that included protection of private 
property.108 While the Constitution does include numerous provisions on 
economic interests relevant to property,109 there is no specific “property 
clause” affirming a fundamental right of property.110
In the Bill of Rights, ratified three years after the Constitution,111 
Madison was able to incorporate specific protections for property.112 As 
adopted, the Fifth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o per-
son shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”113 The placement of property in the Fifth Amendment, 
rather than the First Amendment, raises questions about the degree of 
protection afforded by its inclusion in the Constitution. James W. Ely, Jr. 
argues that the placement of property in the Fifth Amendment along with 
the “criminal justice protections” creates a “close association of property 
rights with personal liberty,”114 linking property to fundamental civil 
rights.115 Richard Epstein, on the other hand, asserts that “all rights [in 
 
 108. ELY, supra note 88, at 54.  
 109. Id. at 43–47. 
 110. See id. at 46–47; Alexander, Constitutionalising Property, supra note 90, at 90. 
 111. The Constitution was ratified in 1788, while the Bill of Rights was ratified in 
1791. 
 112. Interestingly, the just compensation clause was the only provision in the Bill of 
Rights that had not been requested by any of the states. See Treanor, Origins of Just 
Compensation, supra note 93, at 708–09. 
 113. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 114. ELY, supra note 88, at 54. Ely goes so far as to state that “[t]he Fifth Amendment 
explicitly incorporated into the Constitution the Lockean conception that protection of 
property is a chief aim of government.” Id. 
 115. After the adoption of the Bill of Rights, Madison expanded upon his definition of 
property in an essay simply entitled “Property.” In that essay, Madison expressly linked 
property and civil rights: 
There he explicitly contended that the term “property” has two meanings: it si-
multaneously embraces a private, Blackstonian conception and a public, if not 
civic, conception. The private meaning is [Blackstone’s] familiar legal concep-
tion of property . . . . Madison emphasized that a second, “juster” meaning must 
be added to this common-law understanding in which property “embraces 
every thing to which a man may attach a value and have a right.” The first 
meaning includes a man’s “land,” “merchandize,” and “money.” The second 
sense extends the meaning of property to include a person’s opinions and “the 
free communication of them.” It also includes “the free use of [one’s] faculties 
and the free choice of the objects on which to employ them.” This second 
meaning encompasses what we today would think of as “civil” rights. 
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the Bill of Rights] are . . . fundamental.”116 Gregory Alexander, however, 
draws attention to the fact that “property [has] not been treated as a fun-
damental right, equal in status to the Due Process Clause’s liberty inter-
est or rights under the Equal Protection Clause.”117 He observes that 
“[c]ourts treat liberty interests as ‘fundamental,’ vigorously protecting 
them against all governmental encroachments save those undertaken for 
‘compelling’ reasons. Property interests, on the other hand, cannot resist 
any governmental encroachment that passes a weak ‘rationality’ stan-
dard.”118
 
ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY, supra note 105, at 68. Laura S. Underkuffler 
also argues, to a different end than Ely, that the Framers had a broad view of property: 
The most apparent difference between this [comprehensive] conception of 
property and most contemporary [absolutist] formulations is its explicit inclu-
sion of a very broad range of individual interests under the rubric of property. 
The comprehensive approach to property goes far beyond property as physical 
objects and their analogs to include freedom of expression, freedom of con-
science, free use of faculties, and free choice of occupations. The inclusion of a 
broad range of individual rights, liberties, powers and immunities in the con-
ception of property changes the nature of property’s concreteness. Its concrete-
ness lies not in an actual or symbolic tie to corporeal or incorporeal objects, but 
in the mediating function that property serves between individual rights and 
governmental power. 
Underkuffler, supra note 88, at 139. 
 116. EPSTEIN, supra note 88, at 143.  
 117. Gregory S. Alexander, Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right? The 
German Example, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 734 (2003) [hereinafter Alexander, Funda-
mental Rights]; see also Alexander, Constitutionalising Property, supra note 90, at 91–92 
(stating that “property is not treated in American constitutional law as a fundamental 
right,” and that the Fifth Amendment “merely provides that” the government may not 
take property except for a public purpose and with just compensation). Cf. C. Edwin 
Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. 
REV. 741 (1986) (arguing that some property rights should receive more constitutional 
protection); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555 
(1997) (same). 
 118. Alexander, Fundamental Rights, supra note 117, at 735; see also Carol M. Rose, 
Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 332 (1996) (“Other 
doubts about property are raised in the double standard of rights introduced by the notori-
ous footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products, according to which ‘mere’ eco-
nomic rights like property take a constitutional back seat to the rights associated with 
political participation or the avoidance of majoritarian oppression.”); Laura S. Underkuf-
fler-Freund, Property: A Special Right, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1033, 1043 (1996) (ar-
guing that property must receive less protection than other rights, such as freedom of 
speech or religion). Professor Alexander’s understanding has recently been reinforced by 
Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), and Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 
528 (2005). In both cases, the Supreme Court refused to apply a higher standard review 
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In spite of this disagreement among modern scholars about whether or 
not the “constitutionalization” of property in the Fifth Amendment estab-
lishes its status as a fundamental right, most commentators agree that 
Madison and his contemporaries expected the just compensation clause 
to have limited legal consequences.119 Madison intended that his propos-
als for the Bill of Rights be noncontroversial,120 and, for the most part, he 
simply incorporated rights already recognized in state constitutions or 
common law.121 In the case of the property provisions of the Fifth 
Amendment, he apparently succeeded in his intent, because there is no 
evidence of any debate or opposition.122 A just compensation provision 
that applied only to the federal government123 and only to physical tak-
 
for property interests, rejecting a substantive due process role for the Court in reviewing 
legislative determinations. 
 119. See Treanor, Origins of Just Compensation, supra note 93, at 708, 710–13; see 
also John F. Beggs, The Theoretical Foundations of the Takings Clause and the Utiliza-
tion of Historical Conceptions of Property in the Ecological Age, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 
867, 894 (1995) (“[T]he inclusion of a takings clause in the Constitution was not a sig-
nificant concern of the Framers and therefore no such provision was included in the 
document. Even after the Convention, none of the states actually lobbied for the inclusion 
of a takings clause in the Bill of Rights.”); John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Re-
public and the Original Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1099, 1132–
33 (2000) (stating that, at the time it was ratified, not much was said about the Takings 
Clause, and the Framers’ silence indicates that they understood the takings clause to be a 
“confirmation of the status quo”); Charles P. Lord, Stonewalling the Malls: Just Compen-
sation and Battlefield Protection, 77 VA. L. REV. 1637, 1668 (1991) (stating that the 
Framers did not contemplate the Takings Clause playing a part in health or safety regula-
tions or nuisance law). 
 120. See Treanor, Origins of Just Compensation, supra note 93, at 710 n.92 (“Madison 
proposed only amendments that would not ‘displease the adverse side [the Anti-
Federalists].’”). 
 121. ELY, supra note 88, at 53. 
 122. Id. at 55; Treanor, Origins of Just Compensation, supra note 93, at 713. In fact, 
“[t]here are apparently no records of discussion about the meaning of the clause in either 
Congress or, after its proposal, in the states.” Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 99, at 
791. 
 123. See ELY, supra note 88, at 54; Treanor, Origins of Just Compensation, supra note 
93, at 708. In a later Article, Treanor suggested that: 
Madison would have liked the Takings Clause to have regulated state, as well 
as federal, actions. As a practical matter, however, Madison could not achieve 
this end directly. The movement to secure a bill of rights came from Anti-
federalists who wanted to limit the national government’s power. Madison’s 
proposal to include in the Bill of Rights an amendment preventing the states 
from infringing freedom of the press and freedom of conscience and from de-
nying jury trials was defeated by the Senate. Presumably, an attempt to make a 
takings requirement―a fairly novel right―binding against the states would 
2007] A TALE OF THREE TAKINGS 359 
                                                                                                            
ings124 could not have been particularly controversial at the time since 
the “federal government did not, in fact, exercise its eminent domain 
power until the 1870s.”125
Indeed, both Federalists and Anti-Federalists believed protection of 
private property was necessary to promote prosperity.126 But the Federal-
ists saw the people, particularly the unpropertied majority, as the greatest 
threat to property. Fearing “democratic excesses,” the Federalists sought 
reliance on the judiciary, rather than the legislatures, to protect property 
rights.127 The Fifth Amendment property provisions were intended to 
 
have met with a similar fate. . . . [I]t seems that for political reasons he did not 
try to extend the Takings Clause to the states. 
Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 99, at 843 n.308 (internal citations omitted). The just 
compensation requirement of the Fifth Amendment was not found to be applicable to the 
states until rather late in its history. Treanor explains as follows: 
It is clear that the Takings Clause is now deemed applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the line between substantive due 
process and incorporation was not always a clear one, the precise case that in-
corporated the Takings Clause is a matter of dispute. The standard citation is to 
Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897). Justice Stevens, 
however, has argued that this was a substantive due process case. Professor 
Siegel has stated that incorporation occurred in Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. 
Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896). In Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 154 
U.S. 362, 399 (1894), the Court appears to hold that the Takings Clause is in-
corporated through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. 
Id. at 860 n.369 (internal citations omitted). 
 124. See id. at 798 (“The predecessor clauses to the Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
Clause, the original understanding of the Takings Clause itself, and the weight of early 
judicial interpretations of the federal and state takings clauses all indicate that compensa-
tion was mandated only when the government physically took property.”); see also Lord, 
supra note 119, at 1668 (observing that Madison did not intend for the compensation 
clause to apply to anything other than “direct, physical takings”); Bernard Schwartz, Tak-
ings Clause―“Poor Relation” No More?, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 417, 420 (1994) (“Madi-
son’s word choice indicates that he ‘intended the clause to apply only to direct, physical 
taking of property.’”); Mark Tunick, Constitutional Protections of Private Property: 
Decoupling the Takings and Due Process Clauses, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 885, 886 n.10 
(2001) (“[P]roposing texts of early amendments to the Constitution, Madison suggested 
the following formulation of the Takings Clause: ‘No person shall be . . . obliged to re-
linquish his property, where it may be necessary for public use, without a just compensa-
tion.’”). 
 125. Treanor, Origins of Just Compensation, supra note 93, at 709 n.78. Until Kohl v. 
United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875), which clearly recognized the right of the federal gov-
ernment to condemn land, the federal government had traditionally requested the states to 
condemn land for federal use. 
 126. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY, supra note 105, at 405 n.83. 
 127. Id. at 405–06. 
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provide judicially enforceable limitations on government.128 In his 
speech to Congress proposing the Bill of Rights, Madison conjectured 
that “[i]ndependent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a pe-
culiar manner guardians of those rights . . . .”129 In this respect, Ely 
notes, “Madison proved to be a good prophet.”130  
Although the liberal ideology of the Federalists dominated the constitu-
tional debate in the United States, even this brief overview of the history 
and politics reveals that Madison was constrained by competing republi-
can values from completely realizing his vision of property in the Consti-
tution and Bill of Rights.131 Many scholars reject the notion advocated by 
neoconservatives that the Constitution embodies a monolithic, classical, 
liberal view of property.132 Both republican and liberal views of property 
are represented in the history and politics of the constitutional era and 
“have been present in [United States] property tradition at least since the 
adoption of the Constitution.”133
B. Australia’s Constitutional Property Provisions 
The Australian Constitution was drafted during a series of conventions 
in the 1890s.134 The provision of the Constitution dealing with compul-
sory acquisition of property135 was developed late in the debates and 
arose from concerns distinctly different from those addressed by the 
 
 128. See ELY, supra note 88, at 56; Treanor, Origins of Just Compensation, supra note 
93, at 710–11; Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 99, at 837. 
 129. James Madison, Amendments to the Constitution (June 8, 1789), in 12 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 196, 207 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1979). 
 130. ELY, supra note 88, at 56. 
 131. See supra text accompanying notes 107–10. 
 132. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 88, at 107–70 (exemplifying the liberal, neoconser-
vative conception of property). 
 133. Alexander, Constitutionalising Property, supra note 90, at 92; see also Margaret 
Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of 
Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667 (1988) (“[T]he liberal conception is only incompletely 
embodied in our constitutional practice.”); Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 99, at 
818 (“The power of the republican view of property during [the framing] period shows 
that there was no consensus among the framers that majoritarian decisionmakers could 
not be trusted to determine the appropriate level of protection for property interests.”). 
 134. Simon Evans, Property and the Drafting of the Australian Constitution, 29 FED. 
L. REV. 121, 121 (2001) (Austl.) [hereinafter Evans, Drafting]. The Australian Constitu-
tion came into effect on July 9, 1900. COLIN HOWARD, AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (3d ed. 1985). 
 135. This Article’s discussion will focus on the power of compulsory acquisition of 
property from persons by the Commonwealth under section 51(xxxi) of the Australian 
Constitution.  
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property provisions of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.136 
Having rejected without debate the proposition that property should be a 
subject matter of Commonwealth legislative authority,137 some of the 
Framers expressed concern about whether provisions of the proposed 
Constitution or power incidental to express legislative authorities created 
authority for the Commonwealth to acquire property for public pur-
poses.138 The brief debates on the subject concluded that “there must be a 
power of compulsory taking property for the purposes of the Common-
wealth.”139 That power was provided by section 51(xxxi), which em-
powers the Commonwealth Parliament to enact laws for the “acquisition 
of property on just terms from any State or person for any purpose in 
respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws.” The terms “ac-
quisition,” “property,” and “just terms” were not defined. 
Justice Dixon of the Australian High Court has posited that the roots of 
section 51(xxxi) are found in the U.S. Constitution, stating: “The source 
of [section] 51(xxxi) is to be found in the fifth amendment of the Consti-
tution of the United States, which qualifies the power of the United 
States to expropriate property by requiring that it should be done on 
payment of fair compensation.”140 The constitutional debates and the 
context of the inclusion of section 51(xxxi), however, provide no evi-
dence of this rationale.141 Neither by reference nor by context does the 
Australian provision relate to the circumstances surrounding the adoption 
of the Fifth Amendment. The Australian property provision is included 
in a section of the Constitution segregating and enumerating the powers 
of Parliament, rather than being included in a bill of rights providing spe-
 
 136. See R.W. Baker, The Compulsory Acquisition Powers of the Commonwealth, in 
ESSAYS ON THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 194 (2d ed. 1961); Evans, Drafting, supra 
note 134, at 128; P. H. LANE, LANE’S COMMENTARY ON THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 
216 (1986) (“The sole source of Commonwealth legislative power to acquire compulso-
rily is s. 51(xxxi).”). 
 137. Evans, Drafting, supra note 134, at 125–26. Land law and property law are pri-
marily a state responsibility. Under other heads of authority, however, the Common-
wealth does to some extent regulate property. Australian Constitution section 51(xxvi) 
has allowed regulation of indigenous property rights, while section 51(xxix) has allowed 
environmental regulation associated with international treaty obligations. Id. at 125 n.9.  
 138. See Allen, supra note 32, at 352–53 (“In Australia, there was some doubt whether 
the Commonwealth was sovereign, and hence whether it would have the power of emi-
nent domain in the absence of an express provision to that effect.”); see also Evans, 
Drafting, supra note 134, at 128–29; R. L. Hamilton, Some Aspects of the Acquisition 
Power of the Commonwealth, 5 FED. L. REV. 265, 266–67 (1973) (Austl.). 
 139. Evans, Drafting, supra note 134, at 129. 
 140. Andrews v. Howell, (1941) 65 C.L.R. 255, 282 (Austl.); see also Australian Ap-
ple & Pear Marketing Bd. v. Tonking, (1942) 66 C.L.R. 77, 82 (Austl.). 
 141. Evans, Drafting, supra note 134, at 130. 
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cific recognition of individual rights.142 Section 51(xxxi) is a positive 
grant of power limited by the purpose of the acquisition and the require-
ment of “just terms.” The Fifth Amendment is stated in the negative, lim-
iting an inherent right of government.143 Section 51(xxxi) was intended 
to assure that the government had the authority to exercise eminent do-
main, while the Fifth Amendment was intended to limit an inherent 
power of eminent domain by creating rights in individuals. The wordings 
of the two provisions, though somewhat similar, have distinct differ-
ences.144 Justice Dixon later noted that American experience and judicial 
decisions, though helpful, “cannot be applied directly to s. 51(xxxi).”145
The lack of debate surrounding section 51(xxxi) does not mean that 
property was not a central political issue in development of the Austra-
lian Constitution, rather that the context was quite different from the U.S. 
experience. Fear of a democratic government that would subject property 
rights to redistribution at the will of an unpropertied majority was not a 
significant issue in the Australian debates.146 Commentators have attrib-
uted the lack of formal protections for property and civil rights in the 
Australian Constitution to the Framers’ confidence in the “institution of 
responsible government.”147 Indeed, one objection raised to the inclusion 
of “just terms” in section 51(xxxi) was that it was it was improper to in-
clude words in a constitution that suggest that the Parliament might not 
“act strictly on the lines of justice.”148 Further, Australia did not go 
through a period of revolutionary upheaval with widespread confisca-
tions of the property of British and Loyalists.149 Rather, the protection of 
British property and encouragement of continued British investment in 
Australia was an issue of major concern for the country’s economic fu-
 
 142. See LANE, supra note 136, at 225.  
 143. See supra text accompanying notes 6–9. 
 144. The references to “acquisition” rather than “taking,” and “just terms” rather than 
“just compensation” are significant departures from the Fifth Amendment. GRAHAM L. 
FRICKE, COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF LAND IN AUSTRALIA 8–9 (2d ed. 1982); see also 
Baker, supra note 136, at 220 (stating that their “intentions and wording” are different). 
 145. Grace Bros. Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth, (1946) 72 C.L.R. 169, 290 (Austl.). 
 146. Evans, Drafting, supra note 134, at 131. 
 147. Hilary Charlesworth, The Australian Reluctance About Rights, 31 OSGOODE HALL 
L.J. 195, 197 (1993) (Can.). Charlesworth, however, argues that reliance on responsible 
government is inadequate to protect interests of minorities. Id. at 198.  
 148. Evans, Drafting, supra note 134, at 128; see also Robert C. L. Moffat, Philoso-
phical Foundations of the Australian Constitutional Tradition, 5 SYDNEY L. REV. 59, 85–
86 (1965) (“[T]he protections to individual rights provided by the traditions of acting as 
honourable men were quite sufficient for a civilised society.”). 
 149. See Evans, Drafting, supra note 134, at 131. 
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ture.150 In light of the “longstanding British and colonial tradition” in 
Australia of providing compensation when the government compulsorily 
acquired property,151 the debate centered not on the issue of a compensa-
tion clause, but on the “clarity and certainty of property rights and the 
impartial determination of property disputes”152 and on whether issues 
concerning property and investment would be subject to appeal to Brit-
ain’s Privy Council.153
While the debates contain numerous references to protection of life, 
liberty, and property as the proper role of government,154 it is clear that 
property did not serve the symbolic role that it did in the Madisonian 
conceptualization of property as a proxy for personal liberty.155 In his 
analysis of the drafting of section 51(xxxi), Simon Evans concludes that 
“it is difficult to fix on an American constitutional provenance for . . . 
[section 51(xxxi)] and attribute to the Framers an intention that it reflect 
an American constitutional guarantee”156 and that there is “no basis in 
the Debates” to determine that the section was intended “as a broad guar-
antee of individual rights.”157 Although section 51(xxxi) was the first 
provision of its kind in the constitution of a Commonwealth country,158 
Evans suggests that the section draws more on the British tradition than 
on the U.S. Constitution.159 In England, although the King and, later, 
Parliament could have compulsorily acquired property through the power 
of eminent domain without compensation, R. W. Baker points out that 
there is no historical evidence of the British Crown or Parliament having 
done so.160 Robert Moffat also agrees that Australia’s “legal and phi-
losophical traditions have been largely inherited from England”161 and 
suggests that references in the constitutional debates to the U.S. Constitu-
tion were not for purposes of imitating the United States, but “simply 
happened to serve the purposes of the debaters who used it to bolster 
 
 150. Id. at 138–39. 
 151. Id. at 132. 
 152. Id. at 138. 
 153. Id. at 138–40. 
 154. See id. at 129. 
 155. See supra text accompanying note 107. 
 156. Evans, Drafting, supra note 134, at 132. 
 157. Id. at 131. 
 158. Thomas Allen, Commonwealth Constitutions and the Right Not To Be Deprived of 
Property, 42 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 523, 525 (1993). 
 159. Evans, Drafting, supra note 134, at 132. 
 160. Baker, supra note 136, at 194. For this proposition, Baker relies on research com-
plied in the case Attorney-General v. De Keyser’s Royal Hotel Ltd., (1920) A.C. 508 
(H.L.) (U.K.).  
 161. Moffat, supra note 148, at 77. 
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their arguments.”162 Both Baker163 and Moffat164 warn, however, that 
English, as well as American, authority must be used cautiously in inter-
preting section 51(xxxi). “[T]he particular interrelationships of institu-
tional operation, tradition, and legal philosophy which have developed in 
the Australian circumstance have been clearly, if not distinctly, its 
own.”165
C. Canada’s Rejection of the Constitutionalization of Property 
Like Britain, Canada does not have a constitution embodied in a single 
document.166 The British North America (BNA) Act of 1867,167 which in 
1982 was renamed the Constitution Act, 1867,168 was the country’s first 
constitutional framework document. The BNA Act was enacted by the 
British Parliament and created the Dominion of Canada, which continued 
to be a British colony.169 The Act did not attempt to incorporate all of 
Canada’s constitutional principles, but merely to provide the rules neces-
sary to establish the confederation and allocate power between the fed-
eral Parliament and the provincial legislatures.170 The preamble of the 
Act itself stated that Canada’s Constitution was to be similar in principle 
to Britain’s.171 The BNA Act provided no process for amending Can-
ada’s constitution domestically, so the country’s constitutional law con-
tinued to draw on a number of sources, including British law and tradi-
tion.172
It is hardly surprising then that the BNA Act contained no U.S.-style 
bill of rights or specific provisions for protection of property. The Fa-
thers of the Confederation were, however, quite aware of the tensions 
between property and democracy, and strongly supported liberal concep-
tions assuring the primacy of property.173 The Confederation Debates 
also reflect the concerns for protection of property from majority rule.174 
 
 162. Id. at 79. 
 163. Baker, supra note 136, at 198–99. 
 164. See Moffat, supra note 148, at 88. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA § 1.2 (1997). 
 167. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5 
(Appendix 1985). 
 168. HOGG, supra note 166, § 53(2). 
 169. Id. § 1.2. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See Alexander Alvaro, Why Property Rights Were Excluded from the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 24 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 309, 313 (1991). 
 174. Id. 
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But rather than memorializing individual rights in the BNA Act, the Ca-
nadian Fathers chose to protect property by establishing a Senate whose 
members were appointed from the propertied class.175 The Senate’s veto 
power over legislation passed by the House of Commons was intended to 
guarantee that property rights would not be subjected to majoritarian 
rule.176
Canada’s Senate proved to be ineffective in this role. Time and infla-
tion made the property ownership requirement virtually meaningless. 
Senators voted on the basis of party affiliation rather than other inter-
ests,177 and the public resented the idea of an appointed body exercising 
a veto power over legislation enacted by elected officials.178 The model 
of responsible government adopted by Canada dictates that the ministers 
and cabinet are responsible to the elected House of Commons, not the 
Senate.179 With “no obvious place in this scheme of things,” the Senate 
exercises restraint in “recognition that, as an appointed body, it has no 
political mandate to obstruct the House of Commons.”180 Thus, property 
rights in Canada were subordinated to the dictates of democratic institu-
tions.181
Support for more explicit protection of property and other individual 
rights and freedoms did not emerge until after World War II.182 In 1960, 
 
 175. Constitution Act para. 17, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in 
R.S.C., No. 5 (Appendix 1985). Qualifications for appointment to the Senate included 
ownership of property at least “[f]our thousand [d]ollars over and above his [d]ebts and 
[l]iabilities.” Id. para. 23(4). The nature of the Senate and the franchise in relation to 
property were major issues in the Australian constitutional debates. In the end, it was 
resolved that both the Senate and House of Representatives would be elected, and that 
franchise would be the same for both. Evans, Drafting, supra note 134, at 144–47. 
 176. See Alvaro, supra note 173, at 313–14. 
 177. See id. at 315 (“The Senate . . . became . . . a rubber stamp for Commons legisla-
tion and a burial ground for political patrons.”). 
 178. See id; see also HOGG, supra note 166, § 9.4(c). 
 179. HOGG, supra note 166, § 9.4(c). “If government policy is defeated by the House 
of Commons, then the government must resign and make way, either for a new govern-
ment that can command the support of the House of Commons, or for an election that 
will provide a new House of Commons.” Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Alvaro notes that the property debate continued on the question of whether the 
federal or provincial legislatures had jurisdiction over property issues, not on “whether or 
not property ownership ought to have been subordinated to the dictates of legislatures.” 
Alvaro, supra note 173, at 316.   
 182. See id.; see also Philip W. Augustine, Protection of the Right to Property Under 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 18 OTTAWA L. REV. 55, 61 (1986). 
Augustine notes that in addition to the political and academic support that arose after 
World War II for adoption of a bill of rights, some members of the Supreme Court of 
Canada between 1938 and 1957 had begun to formulate an “implied bill of rights” based 
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the Canadian Bill of Rights183 was enacted, not as a constitutional meas-
ure, but as an ordinary statute applicable only to the federal govern-
ment.184 Section 1(a) of the Canadian Bill of Rights provides: 
It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed 
and shall continue to exist without discrimination . . . the following 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, namely: 
(a) the right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person and 
the enjoyment of property and the right not to deprived thereof except 
by due process of law.185
Federal legislation that conflicts with Bill of Rights protections is in-
operative, unless the conflicting legislation expressly states that it oper-
ates notwithstanding the Bill of Rights.186 Canadian courts have been 
reluctant to read the Bill of Rights broadly, however, because it is simply 
a statute, not a constitutional document. It does “not reflect a clear con-
stitutional mandate to make judicial decisions having the effect of limit-
ing or qualifying the traditional sovereignty of Parliament.”187
Section 1(a) of the Bill of Rights contains no requirement that the fed-
eral government compensate for the appropriation of property, but the 
language bears a close resemblance to the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution, which provides in relevant part: “nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law.”188 The Fourteenth Amendment similarly does not incorporate a 
specific obligation for states to compensate individuals when property is 
appropriated, but the U.S. Supreme Court has found that the requirement 
of “just compensation” can be implied from the due process clause.189 
One Canadian commentator notes, however, that: 
 
on the Constitution Act, 1867. However, “the implied bill of rights was never recognized 
by a majority of the [Court], and never extended to the protection of the right to prop-
erty.” Id. at 60–61.  
 183. The Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C., ch. 44 (1960). 
 184. Hogg states that the government was “reluctant to resort to the anachronistic 
[amendment] procedures” and that the provinces would not have agreed to a bill of rights 
that applied to them. HOGG, supra note 166, § 32.1. Alvaro cites the possibility of the 
weakening of democratic institutions by subjecting legislation to review by a non-elected 
court as an additional factor. See Alvaro, supra note 173, at 316–17.  
 185. The Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C., ch. 44 § 1(a) (1960). 
 186. See R. v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282 (Can.). 
 187. R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (Can.); see also R. v. Bryan, [1999] 134 Man. 
R.2d 61 (Man. C.A.) (“Since the Bill of Rights is not a true constitutional document, 
there is no mandate to set aside the will of Parliament through judicial review.”). 
 188. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 189. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
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Not only is this American jurisprudence irrelevant because its legal 
foundation is fundamentally different than ours, but in addition, our le-
gal tradition is quite different. Before the enactment of the Canadian 
Bill of Rights and the Charter, our courts followed the English concept 
of “due process of law” which because of the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty prevented any review of legislative action . . . .190
Courts interpreting the due process provision have also rejected the no-
tion of importing the American concept of substantive due process into 
interpretation of section 1(a) of the Canadian Bill of Rights. In R. v. Ap-
pleby (No. 2),191 the New Brunswick Supreme Court rejected the argu-
ment that due process should be interpreted under the Canadian Bill of 
Rights as having substantive, in addition to procedural, content.192 In 
Curr v. The Queen,193 Justice Laskin of the Canadian Supreme Court 
demonstrated his wariness of applying American substantive due process 
analysis to the Canadian Bill of Rights, stating: 
The very large words of s. 1(a), tempered by a phrase (“except by due 
process of law”) whose original English meaning has been overlaid by 
American constitutional imperatives, signal extreme caution to me 
when asked to apply them in negation of substantive legislation validly 
enacted by a Parliament in which the major role is played by elected 
representatives of the people.194
Justice Laskin did not, however, totally exclude the possibility of read-
ing substantive content into the due process rights if given “compelling 
reasons” and “objective and manageable standards” to guide the court.195
The Canadian Supreme Court most recently addressed the question of 
the substantive content of section 1(a)’s property provisions in Authorson 
v. Canada (Att’y General).196 While stating that “Canadian courts have 
been wary of recognizing such protections,”197 the Supreme Court again 
did not completely reject the proposition that section 1(a) may embody 
 
 190. Jean McBean, The Implications of Entrenching Property Rights in Section 7 of the 
Charter of Rights, 26 ALBERTA L. REV. 548, 567 (1988) (Can.). 
 191. [1976] 15 N.B.R.2d 650 (N.B.C.A.). 
 192. Id.; see also Smith, Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. v. Can. (Att’y General), 
[1986] 1 F.C. 274 (Fed. Ct.). 
 193. [1972] S.C.R. 889 (Can.). 
 194. Id. at 902. 
 195. Id. at 899–900. 
 196. [2003] 2 S.C.R. 40 (Can.). 
 197. Id. at 56. The Court attributed this to the American experience during the Lochner 
era. Id. The Court also noted, however, that recent jurisprudence under the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms might lead to more substantive protections. Id. at 58. 
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substantive property protections.198 The Court was clear, however, that a 
right to compensation for expropriation of property was not among any 
possible protections. The Bill of Rights recognizes and protects only 
rights that existed in 1960 prior to its enactment.199 The Court found that 
“[a]t that time it was undisputed, as it continues to be today, that Parlia-
ment had the right to expropriate property if it made its intention 
clear.”200 The Court bolstered its conclusion by referring to Justice Rid-
dell’s oft-quoted statement in a turn-of-the-century case: 
In short, the Legislature within its jurisdiction can do everything that is 
not naturally impossible, and is restrained by no rule human or divine. 
If it be that the plaintiffs acquired any rights, which I am far from find-
ing, the Legislature had the power to take them away. The prohibition, 
“Thou shalt not steal,” has no legal force upon the sovereign body. And 
there would be no necessity for compensation to be given.201
Consequently, property rights, which were not protected before 1960, 
receive no additional protection by the Bill of Rights from legislation 
that unambiguously provides for expropriation without compensation. 
For those who had advocated a Canadian bill of rights, the 1960 en-
actment was a distinct disappointment: it applied only to the federal gov-
ernment and not to the provinces; it was merely a statute subject to re-
peal, amendment, or override by the Parliament; and its application and 
interpretation by the courts was narrow and non-interventionist.202 
Among those who sought more protections was Pierre Trudeau, Prime 
Minister of Canada for most of the period between 1968 and 1984.203 For 
the Trudeau government, amendment of the Constitution to include an 
effective bill of rights was a primary goal. This was achieved with en-
 
 198. See id. (“It is unnecessary to decide now exactly what other substantive protec-
tions, if any, might be conferred by the Bill of Rights’ s. 1(a)’s property guarantees.”). 
 199. Id. at 52; see also R. v. Miller, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 680 (Can.) (holding that no abso-
lute right to life existed prior to the Bill of Rights, so a death penalty statute was not in-
operative); R. v. Burnshine, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 693 (Can.) (holding that a right to uniform 
sentencing across different regions of Canada did not exist prior to 1960, and was there-
fore not protected by the Bill of Rights). 
 200. Authorson, [2003] 2 S.C.R. at 58.  
 201. Florence Mining Co. v. Cobalt Lake Mining Co., [1909] 18 O.L.R. 275, 279 (Ont. 
C.A.). 
 202. See HOGG, supra note 166, § 33.1. Hogg notes that in the twenty-two years be-
tween the Bill of Rights’ enactment and the Charter’s adoption, only one Supreme Court 
case held an act of Parliament to be inoperative for breach of the Bill of Rights. Id.  
§ 32.5.  
 203. See id. § 33.1. 
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actment through constitutional procedures of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms as Part I of the new Constitution Act, 1982.204
The Charter is applicable to both the federal government and the prov-
inces.205 Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 provides that the 
Constitution is the “supreme law of Canada.” Section 52(3) “entrenches” 
the Charter by providing that it can only be changed through procedures 
laid out in the Constitution Act, 1982 and not through ordinary legisla-
tion.206 The entrenchment of the Charter laid the foundation for the 
courts rather than legislatures to exercise the primary responsibility for 
the protection of individual rights and freedoms. The scope of the Char-
ter’s guaranteed rights is, however, limited by section 1 which “implic-
itly authorizes the courts to balance the guaranteed rights against compet-
ing societal values.”207 Section 1 provides: 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights 
and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits pre-
scribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democ-
ratic society.208
The Charter’s expanded degree of judicial review allows the courts to 
determine “whether the enacting legislative body has made an appropri-
ate compromise between the civil libertarian values guaranteed by the 
Charter and the competing social or economic objectives pursued by the 
law.”209
Providing the ability for a non-elected court to overturn the decisions 
of democratically elected officials was not uncontroversial,210 and the 
 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See id. § 1.4. 
 207. Id. § 33.4(c). 
 208. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms art. 1, Part 1 of the Constitution Act 
1982 (Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.)) [hereinafter Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms]. 
 209. HOGG, supra note 166, at § 33.4(c); see also Reference re Section 94(2) of the 
Motor Vehicle Act (Motor Vehicle Act Reference Case), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 (Can.). 
 210. The Canadian Supreme Court in The Motor Vehicle Act Reference Case, summa-
rized the controversy as follows: 
Yet, in the context of s. 7, and in particular of the interpretation of “principles 
of fundamental justice,” there has prevailed in certain quarters an assumption 
that all but a narrow construction of s. 7 will inexorably lead the courts to 
“question the wisdom of enactments,” to adjudicate upon the merits of public 
policy. From this have sprung warnings of the dangers of a judicial “super-
legislature” beyond the reach of Parliament, the provincial Legislatures and the 
electorate. The Attorney-General for Ontario, in his written argument, stated 
that, “the judiciary is neither representative of, nor responsive to the electorate 
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controversy was perhaps most dramatically played out in the case of 
property rights. Section 7 of the Charter, as adopted, reads: 
Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of the person and the 
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles 
of fundamental justice.211  
The section has some conspicuous omissions. First, the right to enjoy-
ment of property is not included as in section 1(a) of the Bill of Rights. 
Second, the words “due process” are omitted and replaced by the concept 
of “fundamental justice.” The Trudeau government originally proposed 
to include property rights within section 7. Attempts were made before 
enactment of the Charter to amend the section to entrench property 
rights, but proposed amendments were defeated.212  
While the precise influence of the U.S. Constitution on the protection 
of property rights in the Australian Constitution is not clear, there is no 
doubt of its effect in the case of the Constitution Act, 1982. In spite of 
the Canadian Supreme Court’s conservative interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights’ section 1 “due process” provision213 and additional checks and 
balances included in the Charter,214 Canada’s Department of Justice 
feared that inclusion of property rights and due process in a constitu-
tional enactment might lead to “extreme substantive intervention” by the 
courts that would interfere with social and economic regulation.215 The 
specter of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Lochner era216 “cast its shadow over 
Canada as well”217 and “demonstrated the hazard of granting to the 
 
on whose behalf, and under whose authority policies are selected and given ef-
fect in the laws of the land.” This is an argument which was heard countless 
times prior to the entrenchment of the Charter but which has, in truth, for better 
or for worse, been settled by the very coming into force of the Constitution Act, 
1982. 
Motor Vehicle Act Reference Case, [1985] 2 S.C.R. at 497. 
 211. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 208, art. 7. 
 212. See Alvaro, supra note 173, at 320–26; Augustine, supra note 182, at 67–68; 
McBean, supra note 190, at 550. 
 213. The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected substantive due process analysis in the con-
text of economic rights. See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 214. See supra text accompanying notes 208–10 for a description of the limits imposed 
by section 1 of the Charter. 
 215. See Augustine, supra note 182, at 67. 
 216. For an excellent discussion of the influence of Lochner on the drafting of the Ca-
nadian Charter, see Sujit Choudhry, The Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutional-
ism, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1, 16–27 (2004). 
 217. HOGG, supra note 166, § 44.7(b). Sujit Choudhry provides interesting insights 
into the meaning of Lochner to Canadian constitutional thought. He states that: 
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judges the power to review legislation on a ground as inherently inde-
terminate as substantive due process.”218 The provinces viewed constitu-
tional entrenchment of property rights as encroaching upon their jurisdic-
tions,219 and they were concerned that foreign ownership laws and land 
use regulation might be found by activist courts to violate property rights 
guarantees.220 The New Democratic party took the position that inclusion 
of property rights in section 7 would “generally render the provinces in-
capable of effectively legislating with respect to land utilization.”221 Pro-
fessor Peter Hogg concludes: 
The framers of Canada’s Charter of Rights deliberately omitted any 
reference to property in s. 7, and they also omitted any guarantee of the 
obligation of contracts. These departures from the American model, as 
well as the replacement of “due process” with “fundamental  
justice” . . . were intended to banish Lochner from Canada.222
The banishment was not quite complete, because the Supreme Court of 
Canada has interpreted section 7 of the Charter as having substantive as 
well as procedural aspects in the interpretation of the term “fundamental 
justice.”223 In the Motor Vehicle Reference Case,224 the Court rejected 
the procedural/substantive dichotomy,225 stating that the Court had al-
 
[T]he Lochner era looms as parable or a cautionary tale. Lochner is regarded as 
a powerful symbol of deep and profound constitutional failure . . . . The invoca-
tion of Lochner operates rhetorically as an epithet, as a signal of potential dan-
ger. Indeed, the ongoing citation of Lochner . . . bears testimony to its rhetori-
cal power. 
Choudhry, supra note 216, at 53. 
 218. HOGG, supra note 166, § 44.10(a). 
 219. See Alvaro, supra note 173, at 319–20. 
 220. See McBean, supra note 190, at 550; see also A. J. van der Walt, The Constitu-
tional Property Clause: Striking a Balance Between Guarantee and Limitation, in PROP-
ERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 109, 110 (Janet McLean ed., 1999). 
 221. See McBean, supra note 190, at 550. 
 222. HOGG, supra note 166, § 44.7(b). 
 223. The Court came to this conclusion in spite of clear evidence that the framers in-
tended the phrase to be synonymous with “principles of fundamental justice” which is 
understood in Canadian jurisprudence to mean procedural due process. McBean, supra 
note 190, at 568–69. 
 224. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 (Can.). 
 225. Justice Lamer, writing for the majority, explained, as follows: 
The substantive/procedural dichotomy narrows the issue almost to an all-or-
nothing proposition. Moreover, it is largely bound up in the American experi-
ence with substantive and procedural due process. It imports into the Canadian 
context American concepts, terminology and jurisprudence, all of which are in-
extricably linked to problems concerning the nature and legitimacy of adjudica-
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ways engaged in review of the content of legislation and that the Charter 
simply broadened the scope of that review.226 Justice Lamer stated the 
“interpretation should be . . . a generous rather than a legalistic one, 
aimed at fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee and securing for indi-
viduals the full benefit of the Charter’s protection.”227 Fundamental jus-
tice is guaranteed, however, only in relation to the rights incorporated in 
section 7. Professor Hogg asserts that the omission of property rights 
from section 7 precludes the interpretation of the terms “liberty” and “se-
curity” to include economic rights, “otherwise, property, having been 
shut out of the front door, would enter by the back.”228
The Bill of Rights was not repealed by the Charter, but it now has lim-
ited effect. Only two provisions of the Bill of Rights were not duplicated 
in the Charter: section 1(a), the due process clause which protects en-
joyment of property; and section 2(e), which guarantees a fair hearing in 
designated circumstances.229 Section 1(a) remains operative and contin-
ues to provide procedural protections for property at the federal, but not 
provincial, level. 
 
tion under the United States Constitution. . . . We would, in my view, do our 
own Constitution a disservice to simply allow the American debate to define 
the issue for us, all the while ignoring the truly fundamental structural differ-
ences between the two Constitutions. Finally, the dichotomy creates its own set 
of difficulties by the attempt to distinguish between two concepts whose outer 
boundaries are not always clear and often tend to overlap. Such difficulties can 
and should, when possible, be avoided. 
Id. at 498.  
 226. Id. at 495–96.   
 227. Id. at 500. 
 228. HOGG, supra note 166, § 44.9; see also Augustine, supra note 182, at 75–76. Al-
though discussion of the effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
is beyond the scope of this Article, it should be noted that some scholars suggest that a 
new “back door” for property rights protection has been created by NAFTA. These 
scholars argue that NAFTA’s provisions on compensation to investors for direct or indi-
rect expropriations will lead to an Americanization of Canadian constitutional law and 
the “potential rise of Canada’s own period of Lochnerism.” David Schneiderman, 
NAFTA’s Takings Rule: American Constitutionalism Comes to Canada, 46 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 499, 536 (1996) (Can.); see also Ricardo Grinspun & Robert Kreklewich, Consoli-
dating Neoliberal Reforms: Free Trade as a Conditioning Framework, 43 STUD. IN POL. 
ECON. 33 (1994) (arguing that NAFTA is a “conditioning framework” through which 
external policies and constraints imposed by transnational actors become internalized 
outside the democratic process). 
 229. See HOGG, supra note 166, § 32.1. 
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The issue of constitutional property rights remains controversial in 
Canada,230 but relatively recently the Manitoba Court of Appeal suc-
cinctly assessed the current status of such rights: “Section 1(a) of the Ca-
nadian Bill of Rights, which protects property rights through a ‘due proc-
ess’ clause, was not replicated in the Charter, and the right to ‘enjoyment 
of property’ is not a constitutionally protected, fundamental part of Ca-
nadian society.”231
D. Overview 
While the inclusion of property in a country’s constitution does not an-
swer the question of whether compensation is required when government 
regulation affects only the value or use of property, simply the fact that 
property rights have been included in a nation’s constitution has conse-
quences. Professor Nedelsky points out that “constitutionalizing property 
is an extremely powerful symbol of the public/private divide which des-
ignates governmental measures affecting property as public ‘interfer-
ences’ with a sacred private realm―which then bear the burden of justi-
fication.”232 Furthermore, she contends that entrenchment of a constitu-
tional property guarantee creates a protected sphere of private property 
that is increasingly insulated from regulation and that reinforces the myth 
of property as a pre-political and fundamental right.233 She also argues 
convincingly that it bolsters libertarian arguments that market forces, 
rather than state intervention, should control property use and distribu-
tion.234 Thus, Professor Nedelsky concludes that constitutional en-
trenchment of property creates an irresolvable conflict between protec-
tion of private property interests and promotion of public interests.235
The constitutionalization of property enshrines the courts, rather than 
legislative bodies, as the primary arbiters of the private property/public 
interest conflict. It is then within the competence of courts to determine 
the scope of private property protection through their definitions of 
“property” and interpretations of the meaning of “taking,” “acquisition,” 
 
 230. Some of the provinces, commentators, and legislators have continued to argue for 
inclusion of property protections in the Constitution. See Alvaro, supra note 173, at 328–
29; Augustine, supra note 182, at 80; McBean, supra note 190, at 582–83. 
 231. R. v. Bryan, [1999] 134 Man. R.2d 61 (Man. C.A.). 
 232. Jennifer Nedelsky, Should Property Be Constitutionalized? A Relational and 
Comparative Approach, in PROPERTY LAW ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY 
417, 422 (G. E. van Maanen & A. J. van der Walt eds., 1996). 
 233. See id. at 422–23. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 426–28. 
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and “due process.”236 Property is shielded from redefinition and redistri-
bution through democratic processes to the extent courts choose to apply 
constitutional property clauses as a “fundamental barrier-guarantee.”237
Property played a markedly different role in the constitutional history 
of the three countries. Although republican views are represented in U.S. 
constitutional history, there is no doubt that the Federalist framers did 
view property as a symbol of personal liberty―a metaphor for a realm of 
individual autonomy beyond the reach of the democratic will. The guar-
antees of the Bill of Rights were intended to be interpreted by the courts 
to protect the individual from an overreaching government. Australia’s 
Constitution, on the other hand, contains no bill of rights, only constitu-
tional authorization to acquire property on just terms, buried deep in a 
long list of areas subject to federal government jurisdiction and regula-
tion, and generally intended to empower the federal government within 
certain limits. There is little in the constitutional history to suggest that it 
was intended to serve the role of a constitutional guarantee that had been 
consecrated in a bill of rights. 
Australia’s legal traditions concerning compulsory acquisition of prop-
erty seem to be drawn largely from Britain, but another particularly fun-
damental constitutional tradition seems distinctly and importantly drawn 
from the American constitutional experience. The power of judicial re-
view exercised by Australia’s High Court238 is “a striking and fundamen-
tal contrast with the power of the English courts.”239 Through its broad 
power of judicial review, Australia’s High Court has had the opportunity 
to interpret section 51(xxxi) as creating a constitutional guarantee of in-
dividual property rights,240 moving beyond the limited roots of the provi-
 
 236. In the United States, for example, the Supreme Court expanded the protection of 
property through its interpretation of “due process” in the Fourteenth Amendment to 
include a requirement of compensation for state property acquisition. See supra note 7. 
 237. Van der Walt, supra note 220, at 125. 
 238. Neither the U.S. nor Australian constitutions specifically provide for judicial re-
view. Australia’s constitutional debates, however, indicate that its framers intended the 
kind of review exercised by the U.S. Supreme Court. For example, speaking in the de-
bates of the 1898 Convention, Sir Isaac Isaacs stated: 
We are taking infinite trouble to express what we mean in this Constitution; but 
as in America so it will be here, that the makers of the Constitution were not 
merely the Conventions who sat, but the Judges of the Supreme Court. Mar-
shall, Jay, Story, and all the rest of the renowned Judges, who have pronounced 
on the Constitution, have had just as much to do in shaping it as the men who 
sat in the original Conventions. 
Moffat, supra note 148, at 84. 
 239. Id. 
 240. See LANE, supra note 136, at 222. 
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sion designed to assure that the federal government could exercise a lim-
ited power of eminent domain to acquire property.241
Certain justices on the High Court and U.S. Supreme Court have re-
cently expressed views that seem to reinforce Professor Nedelsky’s con-
cerns about the constitutionalizing of property leading to increasingly 
broad protections. Chief Justice Rehnquist of the U.S. Supreme Court 
indicated that he saw “no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment 
or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor rela-
tion.”242 Justice Kirby of the High Court has also stated that although the 
Australian Constitution “may sometimes fall short of giving effect to 
fundamental rights,”243 when ambiguous, the Constitution should be in-
terpreted to protect such “universal and fundamental rights” as the right 
to a “legal process which includes provision for just compensation” for 
government acquisition of private property.244  
Property has been broadly defined in both countries’ constitutional 
contexts,245 but not to the extent that “use,” in and of itself, is considered 
“property” that is constitutionally protected.246 Certainly, when the fram-
ers of the American and Australian Constitutions crafted their provisions 
for protection of property, they could not have imagined the current regu-
latory state and the extent to which property use and values might be af-
fected by land use and environmental laws. Canada, however, drafted the 
Constitution Act, 1982 fully aware of the need for environmental and 
land use regulation in the modern world and the tensions that such regu-
lations create with absolutist theories of private property. Further, Can-
ada was cognizant of the history of U.S. courts in developing a theory of 
regulatory taking and in reviewing legislative actions on the basis of sub-
stantive due process. Canada’s decision not to constitutionalize property 
 
 241. See van der Walt, supra note 220, at 129–30. Simon Evans’ analysis also con-
cluded that the provision, as it was originally included, was assumed to cover only the 
appropriation of land. See Evans, Drafting, supra note 134, at 130. 
 242. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994). 
 243. Newcrest Mining, (1997) 190 C.L.R. at 657. 
 244. Id. at 658. 
 245. P. H. Lane synthesizes from a number of High Court cases the following defini-
tion of property: “[P]roperty is the most comprehensive term that can be used . . . com-
prising any interest in any property . . . not only conventional estates and interests ac-
knowledged at law and in equity whether in reality or in personalty, but also innominate 
and anomalous interests.” LANE, supra note 136, at 222 (internal quotations omitted). The 
U.S. Supreme Court has defined property as “everything capable of private ownership.” 
San Francisco Nat’l Bank v. Dodge, 197 U.S. 70, 90 (1905). 
 246. For example, general zoning laws that restrict certain uses of property do not 
normally require compensation. See infra Part IV.B.  
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manifested the nation’s intention that both the public and private aspects 
of property should continue to be fully realized through federal and pro-
vincial legislative action. This is not to say that in Canada compensation 
for taking of property does not continue to be generally presumed,247 but 
that compensation as a constitutional guarantee is not considered funda-
mental to a just and democratic society. 
IV. MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGULATORY TAKINGS DOCTRINE 
IN THE LAND USE CONTEXT 
A. The United States Experience: The Search for Categorical Rules 
Within four years of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Mahon,248 
the Court decided the case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,249 
which found that governments could limit the use and affect the value of 
land through zoning ordinances that were not “clearly arbitrary and un-
reasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, 
morals, or general welfare.”250 Because the property was alleged to have 
decreased in value by seventy-five percent, the case is often cited for the 
proposition that diminution of value alone does not establish a taking of 
property requiring compensation.251 Recognizing the need for govern-
ments to be able to respond to the needs of a complex and evolving soci-
ety,252 the Court applied an extremely deferential, “fairly debatable” 
standard253 to judicial review of the means legislative bodies used to ad-
dress such issues. Very little additional practical or theoretical guidance 
emerged from the Supreme Court in the next fifty years to assist gov-
ernments or property owners in determining when a regulation “goes too 
far” and requires compensation until the 1970s, when land use and envi-
ronmental regulations exploded. 
 
 247. See infra text accompanying notes 346–55. 
 248. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the Court’s decision in Mahon. 
 249. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 250. Id. at 395. Two years later, however, in Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 
(1928), the Supreme Court did strike down a zoning ordinance as violative of due proc-
ess. Citing Euclid, the Court found that the ordinance had “‘no foundation in reason  
and [was] a mere arbitrary or irrational exercise of [the police] power.’” Id. at 187 (citing 
Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395). 
 251. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 131. 
 252. See Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 386–87. 
 253. Id. at 388. 
2007] A TALE OF THREE TAKINGS 377 
                                                                                                            
With its Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City254 decision in 
1978, the Supreme Court acknowledged the challenge of creating a “set 
formula”255 for determining when a regulation requires compensation 
and opted to continue the “essentially ad hoc, factual inquir[y]”256 that 
characterized the few earlier cases. The Court did, however, identify fac-
tors of “particular significance”257 in evaluating a takings claim, includ-
ing the “economic impact of the regulation on the claimant . . . , particu-
larly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct in-
vestment-backed expectations,”258 and the “character of the governmen-
tal action.”259 The identification of these factors, however, was only a 
prelude to the application of a complex and unpredictable balancing test 
to determine “when ‘justice and fairness’ require that economic injuries 
caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than 
remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.”260
In the next decade, the Supreme Court undertook to provide clearer 
guidelines for identifying regulatory action that required compensation 
under the Fifth Amendment. With Agins v. City of Tiburon261 in 1980, 
the Court attempted to summarize the state of the law by pronouncing 
that the “application of a general zoning law to particular property effects 
a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state 
interests262 or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.”263 
 
 254. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Penn Central involved a claim that New York had taken the 
valuable “air rights” above Grand Central Station when, based on designation of the site 
as a landmark under New York City’s Landmarks Preservation Law, the city refused 
permission to build a fifty-five story office tower over the railroad terminal. 
 255. Id. at 124 (quoting Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)). 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. The Court further described the effect of the character of the government action as 
follows: “A ‘taking’ may more readily be found when the interference with property can 
be characterized as a physical invasion by government than when interference arises from 
some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the 
common good.” Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S at 124 (internal citations omitted).  
 260. Id.  
 261. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
 262. Id. at 260.  
 263. Id. (citing Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 138 n.36). Rather than referring 
to Mahon, Tiburon oddly refers to the concession by the City of New York that Penn 
Central would be entitled to relief if the Terminal ceased to be economically viable. Penn 
Central’s footnote 13 describes the scheme of “relief” available under New York’s land-
mark legislation when the owner of a landmark cannot make “a reasonable return on the 
landmark site.” Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 112 n.13. Possible relief included 
the acquisition of a protective interest in the property by the city through eminent do-
main. Id. 
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Two years later, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,264 
the Supreme Court announced the first categorical taking rule: When 
government requires a property owner to suffer a permanent physical 
invasion of her property―no matter how minor―compensation must be 
provided.265 The Court created a second categorical taking rule in the 
1992 case Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.266 There the Court 
found a per se taking in the unusual circumstance where a regulation de-
prives an owner of all “economically beneficial uses” of the property.267
Then in 2005 in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,268 the Supreme Court 
revisited the rules announced in Agins in order to clarify the distinction 
between regulatory takings and violations of due process. The Court suc-
cinctly surveyed the history of regulatory taking jurisprudence and con-
cluded as follows: 
Although our regulatory takings jurisprudence cannot be characterized 
as unified, these three inquiries (reflected in Loretto, Lucas, and Penn 
Central) share a common touchstone. Each aims to identify regulatory 
actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which 
government directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner 
from his domain. Accordingly, each of these tests focuses directly upon 
the severity of the burden that government imposes upon private prop-
erty rights. The Court has held that physical takings require compensa-
tion because of the unique burden they impose: A permanent physical 
invasion, however minimal the economic cost it entails, eviscerates the 
owner’s right to exclude others from entering and using her property—
perhaps the most fundamental of all property interests. In the Lucas 
context, of course, the complete elimination of a property’s value is the 
determinative factor. And the Penn Central inquiry turns in large part, 
albeit not exclusively, upon the magnitude of a regulation’s economic 
impact and the degree to which it interferes with legitimate property in-
terests.269  
 
 264. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
 265. Id. at 438, 441. The Court in Loretto held that a law requiring landlords to allow 
installation of cable facilities on apartment buildings constituted a taking.  
 266. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Lucas involved coastal regulations that limited or prohib-
ited building within certain areas based on erosion and coastal hazard evaluations. All of 
Lucas’ lots fell within a zone where no habitable structures could be built, and the trial 
court had found that the property had been rendered “valueless.” Id. at 1007. 
 267. Id. at 1019. The Court also found, however, that the regulation would not consti-
tute a per se taking if, based on background principles of property law and nuisance, the 
regulation proscribes a use that was not part of the owner’s title to begin with. The bur-
den of establishing this exception is, however, on the government. Id. at 1027. 
 268. 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
 269. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (internal citations omitted). 
2007] A TALE OF THREE TAKINGS 379 
                                                                                                            
The Court noted that “government regulation―by definition―involves 
the adjustment of rights for the public good,”270 but the role of the Tak-
ings Clause, the Court reiterated, is to “bar Government from forcing 
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and jus-
tice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”271
The Court found that in Agins it had inappropriately commingled due 
process and takings inquiries. While takings analysis focuses primarily 
on the effect of a regulation on private property, the “substantially ad-
vances” formula of Agins “probes the regulation’s underlying valid-
ity.”272 The Court concluded that Agins’s “substantially advances” test is 
“not a valid method of identifying regulatory taking for which the Fifth 
Amendment requires just compensation.”273 In striking down this part of 
the Agins formula, the Court rejected heightened substantive due process 
analysis of land use regulation. Such a rule, the Court stated: 
would require courts to scrutinize the efficacy of a vast array of state 
and federal regulations―a task for which courts are not well suited. 
Moreover, it would empower―and might often require―courts to sub-
stitute their predictive judgments for those of elected legislatures and 
expert agencies. . . . [W]e have long eschewed such heightened scrutiny 
when addressing substantive due process challenges to government 
regulation. The reasons for deference to legislative judgments about the 
need for, and likely effectiveness of, regulatory actions are by now well 
established.274
The unanimous decision in Lingle does not disturb the three primary 
theories for asserting a compensable taking: the two relatively narrow 
categorical taking circumstances―a physical occupation or a taking of 
 
 270. Id. at 538.  
 271. Id. at 542–43. 
 272. Id. at 543. The Court explained: 
In stark contrast to the three regulatory takings tests discussed above, the “sub-
stantially advances” inquiry reveals nothing about the magnitude or character 
of the burden a particular regulation imposes upon private property rights. Nor 
does it provide any information about how any regulatory burden is distributed 
among property owners. In consequence, this test does not help to identify 
those regulations whose effects are functionally comparable to government ap-
propriation or invasion of private property; it is tethered neither to the text of 
the Takings Clause nor to the basic justification for allowing regulatory actions 
to be challenged under the Clause. 
Id. at 542. The Court further noted that no amount of compensation can authorize a regu-
lation that violates due process requirements. Id. at 543. 
 273. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545. 
 274. Id. at 544 (internal citations omitted).  
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all value―and the Penn Central factors that the Court noted serve “as 
the principal guidelines for resolving regulatory takings claims.”275 The 
case does seem to signal, however, somewhat of a retreat in takings ju-
risprudence. Future regulatory takings cases will focus on whether a 
regulation is “functionally comparable to government appropriation or 
invasion of private property,” limiting analysis to “the magnitude [and] 
character of the burden a particular regulation imposes on private prop-
erty rights . . . [and] how the regulatory burden is distributed among 
property owners.”276
The Supreme Court demonstrated in Lingle that the principles applica-
ble to the law of regulatory taking can be succinctly summarized, but 
their application remains enigmatic. While the Court has identified two 
categories of regulations that will be considered per se takings, the cate-
gories are narrow and subject to exceptions that are as indeterminate in 
application as the Penn Central factors.277 In her concurring opinion in 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,278 Justice O’Connor emphasized that “essen-
tially ad hoc, factual inquiries” would continue to be the norm in regula-
tory taking challenges, with Penn Central “provid[ing] important guide 
posts that lead to the ultimate determination of whether just compensa-
tion is required.”279 Significantly, Justice O’Connor noted that these 
guideposts include elements of the public interest as well as protection of 
private property: “The purposes served, as well as the effects produced, 
by a particular regulation inform the takings analysis.”280
 
 275. Id. at 539. 
 276. Id. at 542. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s apparent retreat from Justice 
Scalia’s views of property rights, see Laura Underkuffler, Tahoe’s Requiem: The Death 
of the Scalian View of Property and Justice, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 727 (2004). 
 277. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), where the 
Court found that even if the regulation denied all economic value of property (a per se 
taking), no compensation would be due if the prohibited use was not part of the owner’s 
title because the use was restricted by nuisance and other background principles of prop-
erty law. The Court did not explain what constitutes a background principle of property 
law. For a discussion of the development of this concept, see Michael C. Blumm & Lucus 
Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical 
Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVT’L L. REV. 321 (2005). In the case of finding an excep-
tion based on nuisance law, the complicated balancing test applied is at least as complex 
and unpredictable as Penn Central’s taking analysis. It has been suggested that “there is 
perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds the word 
‘nuisance.’” W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 616 (5th 
ed. 1984). 
 278. 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
 279. Id. at 633–34. 
 280. Id. at 634. 
2007] A TALE OF THREE TAKINGS 381 
                                                                                                            
B. Australia: Constitutional Protection Versus Responsible Government 
Cases involving the just terms requirement of section 51(xxxi) of the 
Australian Constitution were rare until the 1990s, and few have involved 
regulation of land use. The legal inquiry necessary to determine whether 
a regulation requires compensation under the section is perhaps even 
more complicated than U.S. regulatory taking analysis. Because the Aus-
tralian Constitution strictly circumscribes the authority of the federal 
government, analysis typically begins with an arduous consideration of 
whether a regulation is a valid exercise of federal authority within the 
scope of section 51 or some other head of power.281 Section 51(xxxi) 
provides for compensation on just terms for acquisition of property for 
“any purpose in respect of which the Parliament has power to make 
laws” under section 51. There are cases, however, where regulation falls 
squarely within authority granted under the section, but an alleged or 
apparent appropriation of property will not require just terms.282 In some 
cases, this is the result of inelegant constitutional drafting in placing the 
acquisition power in a long list of other constitutional authorities includ-
ing taxation, confiscation of property for breach of laws, and confiscation 
of the property of enemy aliens.283 Compensation for such acquisitions 
of property would be “irrelevant or incongruous”284 and would under-
mine the objective of the law.285
In other cases where the just terms requirement has been found to be 
inapplicable, the High Court has not developed a consistent approach.286 
Instead, the Court has relied upon a number of rationales to explain why 
just terms are not due in particular circumstances.287 Several of these ra-
 
 281. See, e.g., Tasmanian Dam Case, (1983) 158 C.L.R. at 1.  
 282. See Simon Evans, When Is an Acquisition of Property Not an Acquisition of 
Property?, 11 PUB. L. REV. 183 (2000) [hereinafter Evans, Acquisition of Property]. 
 283. See id. at 198. 
 284. Mutual Pools, (1994) 179 C.L.R. at 220.  
 285. See Evans, Acquisition of Property, supra note 282, at 187–89. 
 286. Like many commentators on Australian regulatory takings jurisprudence, Profes-
sor Evans has found the uncertainty surrounding the requirement of just terms problem-
atic in that it “decreases the ability of governments, legislators, and legal advisers to pre-
dict confidently how the High Court will respond to proposed or enacted legislation.” Id. 
at 186. It should be noted that the finding that an acquisition requires just terms can have 
broad consequences. If an acquisition falls within the scope of section 51(xxxi) and just 
terms are not provided, then the legislation as well as the attempted acquisition is “null 
and void.” Baker, supra note 136, at 219. 
 287. Professor Evans catalogs these rationales as follows: (1) necessary to achieve the 
(non-acquisitory) objective of the power; (2) an adjustment of competing rights; (3) di-
rected to prevention of a noxious use; (4) adversely affects or terminates rights rather 
than acquiring them; (5) interest allegedly acquired by the Commonwealth is not prop-
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tionales could be relevant to the denial of just terms in the context of land 
use or environmental regulation. These include: the regulation prevents a 
noxious use of property rights;288 the regulation was a necessary or char-
acteristic means to achieve an authorized objective, not chiefly directed 
at the acquisition of property;289 or the action adversely affects or termi-
nates property rights rather than acquiring them.290 But only two section 
51(xxxi) cases291 have addressed regulations that are arguably catego-
rized as land use regulation: Newcrest Mining and the Tasmanian Dam 
Case. 
In the Tasmanian Dam Case, the Commonwealth sought to stop con-
struction of a dam by the Tasmanian Hydro-Electric Commission on the 
basis that the dam would “inundate significant Aboriginal archaeological 
sites, and . . . cause damage to a wilderness area which is of great natural 
 
erty; (6) acquisition was not “for any purpose in respect of which the Parliament has 
power to make laws”; (7) affects rights that are “inherently susceptible of statutory modi-
fication or extinguishment”; and (8) acquisition was under a head of power that author-
izes laws that do not provide just terms. Evans, Acquisition of Property, supra note 282, 
at 186. 
 288. See Trade Practices Comm’n v. Tooth & Co. Ltd., (1979) 142 C.L.R. 397, 415 
(Austl.). 
 289. See Mutual Pools, (1994) 179 C.L.R. at 180–81; see also Airservices Australia v. 
Canadian Airlines International Ltd., (1999) 202 C.L.R. 133, 180 (Austl.). 
 290. Tasmanian Dam Case, (1983) 158 C.L.R. at 145. 
 291. A third case, Commonwealth v. Western Australia, (1999) 196 C.L.R. 392 
(Austl.), involved the establishment of a defense practice area in Western Australia under 
the Defense Regulations. The defense practice area included areas where conflicts might 
occur with provincial and private mining interests, but the majority of the justices found 
that no inconsistency or acquisition of property had yet occurred. Notable in the case, 
however, is Justice Callinan’s proposal that a test be adopted for section 51(xxxi) that 
recognizes individual interests in property as compensable property. Justice Callinan 
adopted the following approach advanced by R. L. Hamiliton: 
A necessary first step in formulating a test for s. 51(xxxi) . . . is for Australian 
courts firmly to grasp the principle that the various separate rights of user of 
property are in themselves property. The court in Dalziel’s case recognised that 
by taking away some rights of user, in particular the right to possession, the 
Commonwealth could make property practically worthless . . . . What needs to 
be recognised is that property is a bundle of rights, and each right in that bundle 
is itself property the subject of acquisition. Whenever the Commonwealth seeks 
to control the exercise of one of the rights in the bundle a question of acquisi-
tion is on the threshold. 
Id. at 489. This approach, referred to in American legal literature as conceptual severance 
or the “denominator issue,” has been generally rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court. See 
Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130–31 (holding that air rights were not a sever-
able compensable property and that the impact of the regulation must determined in rela-
tion to the property as a whole). 
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significance, and which satisfies the criteria for listing on the World 
Heritage List.”292 After finding that the Commonwealth had authority to 
prohibit construction of the dam without the Tasmanian Minister’s con-
sent, the Court addressed whether the denial of consent “effect[ed] an 
acquisition of property otherwise than on just terms.”293 Citing U.S. 
regulatory taking jurisprudence, Tasmania argued that although the Com-
monwealth legislation did not divest title of the land, it so restricted the 
use of the land and conferred such extensive rights of control over the 
property in the federal Minister that there had been an acquisition of 
property.294 Justice Mason found “no direct relevance to [section] 
51(xxxi)” in the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fifth 
Amendment to find a compensable taking of property if a regulation goes 
too far in restricting use or abridging property rights.295 He contrasted the 
purposes of the constitutional provisions, noting that the American provi-
sion seems to be interpreted to assure appropriate allocation of the costs 
of regulation,296 while section 51(xxxi) focuses on the “acquisition of 
property for purposes of the Commonwealth.”297 Justice Mason ac-
knowledged that maintaining the wilderness character of the land essen-
tially dedicated the land for public use, i.e., protection and conservation, 
but emphasized that the Commonwealth did not acquire “a proprietary 
interest of any kind.”298 For the requirement of just terms to come “into 
play it is not enough that legislation adversely affects or terminates a pre-
existing right that an owner enjoys in relation to his property; there must 
be an acquisition whereby the Commonwealth or another acquires an 
interest in property, however slight or insubstantial it may be.”299
Undoubtedly, the more recent Newcrest Mining case is difficult to rec-
oncile with the Tasmanian Dam Case. A distinction may lie in the fact 
that the Commonwealth owned the land that benefitted from the regula-
 
 292. Tasmanian Dam Case, (1983) 158 C.L.R. at 60. 
 293. Id. at 144. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. at 144–45 (“It seems that the Supreme Court has proceeded according to the 
view that the object of the clause is to prevent government from forcing some people 
alone to bear public burdens which should be undertaken by the entire public.”). 
 297. Tasmanian Dam Case, (1983) 158 C.L.R. at 145. 
 298. Id. at 146. 
 299. Id. at 145. Justices Murphy and Brennan joined Justice Mason in the conclusion 
that there had been no acquisition of property. Justices Wilson and Dawson and Chief 
Justice Gibbs did not decide on the issue, and Justice Deane found that the Act and regu-
lations effected an acquisition. Justice Deane did state, however, that “laws which merely 
prohibit or control a particular use of, or particular acts upon, property plainly do not 
constitute an ‘acquisition.’” Id. at 283. 
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tion in Newcrest, but a clear, quantifiable benefit to the Commonwealth 
could not be established in the Tasmanian Dam Case. Commentators 
suggest that recent cases are interpreting “acquisition” of property more 
broadly.300 But even in an early section 51(xxxi) case, Bank of New 
South Wales v. Commonwealth,301 the High Court had found section 
51(xxxi) was “not to be confined pedantically to the taking of title by the 
Commonwealth to some specific estate or interest in land recognized at 
law or in equity . . ., but that it extends to innominate and anomalous in-
terests.”302 The Court there was interpreting Minister of the Army v. Dal-
ziel303 which involved the question of whether just terms were required 
when the Army for an indefinite period took possession of vacant land 
used by Dalziel, a tenant, to operate a parking lot. Although the Army 
acquired no legal or equitable interest in the land, the acquisition of pos-
session for an indefinite time was held to be an acquisition of prop-
erty.304 Dalziel does, however, perhaps provide the best basis to distin-
guish Newcrest Mining and the Tasmanian Dam Case. In both Dalziel 
and Newcrest Mining, the Commonwealth took complete possession and 
control of the property, leaving the owner with none of the rights that 
constituted the property in question. In the Tasmanian Dam Case, Justice 
Mason of the High Court emphasized the continued possession and re-
siduary rights of the state, explaining that: 
[W]hat is important in the present context is that neither the Common-
wealth nor anyone else acquires by virtue of the legislation a proprie-
tary interest of any kind in the property. The power of the Minister to 
refuse consent under the section is merely a power of veto. He cannot 
positively authorize the doing of acts on the property. As the State re-
mains in all respects the owner, the consent of the Minister does not 
overcome or override an absence of consent by the State in its capacity 
as owner. The fact that the Minister has a power of veto of any devel-
 
 300. See Allen, supra note 32, at 355–58. Simon Evans states that “the distinction be-
tween acquisition and deprivation has been progressively eroded.” Simon Evans, Consti-
tutional Property Rights in Australia: Reconciling Individual Rights and the Common 
Good, in PROTECTING RIGHTS WITHOUT A BILL OF RIGHTS 197, 199 (Tom Campbell et al. 
eds., 2006) [hereinafter Evans, Constitutional Property Rights]. Since Mutual Pools, the 
High Court has looked not to whether the government has acquired title, but to whether 
the government has gained “some identifiable and measurable countervailing benefit or 
advantage.” Id. 
 301. (1948) 76 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.). 
 302. Id. at 349. 
 303. (1944) 68 C.L.R. 261 (Austl.). 
 304. Id. 
2007] A TALE OF THREE TAKINGS 385 
                                                                                                            
opment of or activity on the property does not amount to a vesting of 
possession in the Commonwealth.305
From this perspective, merely restricting the use of land by federal leg-
islation or regulation does not engage the requirement of just terms. This 
comports with the notion that the interest the government receives must 
be able to be conceived as “property.” No property has been acquired if 
the “Commonwealth merely receives the satisfaction of its regulatory 
goals or if the economic position of the property owner is adversely af-
fected.”306
Land use regulation is more generally the subject of state law, rather 
than federal law, and it has been recently reaffirmed that state parlia-
ments are not constrained in enacting legislation by the requirement of 
just terms or just compensation. In Durham Holdings Pty. Ltd. v. New 
South Wales,307 the Parliament of New South Wales passed legislation 
that vested title in the Crown to all coal deposits within the state. Be-
cause the legislation did not provide full compensation to the holders of 
the largest coal deposits, including Durham Holdings, Durham sought to 
have the law invalidated.308 The just terms provision of the federal Con-
stitution does not apply to the Australian states, and the High Court has 
held on numerous occasions that the state parliaments have the authority 
to acquire property even without payment of compensation.309 Durham 
argued, though, that the law must be read in light of the presumption in 
Australian law that the legislature does not intend to acquire property 
without compensation310 and, further, that some common law rights are 
so fundamental and embedded in the legal system that parliament cannot 
override them.311 While acknowledging that a presumption against com-
pulsory taking of property without compensation is a recognized princi-
ple of construction passed down from England and applied by Australian 
courts, the High Court also noted that the presumption could not stand in 
 
 305. Tasmanian Dam Case, 158 C.L.R. at 146. 
 306. Evans, Constitutional Property Rights, supra note 300, at 200. 
 307. (2001) 205 C.L.R. 399 (Austl.). 
 308. Id. at 399–400. 
 309. See Commonwealth v. WMC Resources Ltd., (1998) 194 C.L.R. 1, 58 (Austl.); 
Mabo v. Queensland, (1988) 166 C.L.R. 186, 202 (Austl.); Minister for Lands (N.S.W.) 
v. Pye, (1953) 87 C.L.R. 469, 486 (Austl.); Pye v. Renshaw, (1951) 84 C.L.R. 58, 78–80 
(Austl.); P.J. Magennis Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth, (1949) 80 C.L.R. 382, 403 (Austl.); 
New South Wales v. Commonwealth, (1915) 20 C.L.R. 54, 66 (Austl.). 
 310. Durham Holdings, (2001) 205 C.L.R. at 400. 
 311. Id. at 401, 409–10. 
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the face of a clearly expressed intent of the Parliament in this case not to 
provide full compensation to certain holders of coal mining rights.312
The High Court also rejected any role for the courts in this case in re-
viewing or limiting, on the grounds of deeply rooted, common law rights, 
the legislative powers of Parliament acting within its constitutional pow-
ers.313 While not denying the possible existence of some non-
constitutional limits on the legislative power, the majority opinion over-
whelmingly declined to recognize the definition of “just compensation” 
as being within that “field of discourse.”314 Even Justice Kirby, who em-
phasized the fundamental nature of property rights in Newcrest Mining, 
stated: “It does not rest upon judicial pronouncements to accord, or with-
hold, recognition of the law in question by reference to the judge’s own 
notions of fundamental rights, apart from those constitutionally estab-
lished.”315 Justice Kirby further pointed out the incongruity of the High 
Court imposing such a constitutional limitation on states when only 
twelve years earlier in 1988, the electors in all Australian states had 
soundly rejected a proposal to amend the federal Constitution to make 
acquisitions by states subject to provisions similar to section 51(xxxi).316
In spite of the absence of constitutional protections,317 compensation 
for the effects of land use and environmental regulation on land value is 
a prominent feature of state land use and environmental laws in Austra-
lia. Legislation in Australian states often reflects acceptance of the prin-
ciple that owners should be compensated for “injurious affection” to 
land. The term “injurious affection” was originally found in English leg-
islation compensating an owner for damage or loss of enjoyment of re-
 
 312. Id. at 400, 409. 
 313. Id. at 409–10, 427–28. 
 314. Id. at 410. 
 315. Id. at 427. 
 316. Durham Holdings, (2001) 205 C.L.R. at 427–28. 
 317. The Northern Territory is the only Australian state or territory with a compensa-
tion provision for acquisition of property comparable to the federal constitutional provi-
sion. See Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act, 1978, which provides: 
Acquisition of property to be on just terms 
(1) The power of the Legislative Assembly conferred by section 6 in relation to 
the making of laws does not extend to the making of laws with respect to the 
acquisition of property otherwise than on just terms. 
(2) Subject to section 70, the acquisition of any property in the Territory which, 
if the property were in a State, would be an acquisition to which paragraph 
51(xxxi) of the Constitution would apply, shall not be made otherwise than on 
just terms. 
Id. § 50. 
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tained land caused by activities on a part of the land that had been taken 
by an eminent domain action or, in Australian terminology, on the land 
that had been resumed through compulsory acquisition.318 In Australia, 
the concept of injurious affection has been applied more broadly to in-
clude cases where legislation or regulation affects the value of property 
without the government actually acquiring a property interest in any of 
the owner’s land.319 In this respect, compensation for regulatory taking is 
much more readily available in Australia than in the United States for 
mere limitations on use resulting in diminution of value of land by plan-
ning, zoning, or environmental regulation. 
A comprehensive review of such state compensation provisions320 is 
beyond the scope of this article, but a few examples are instructive. Some 
provisions of planning and environmental legislation continue to use the 
term “injurious affection.” For example, the Western Australia Town 
Planning and Development Act 1928321 provides: 
Any person whose land or property is injuriously affected by the mak-
ing of a town planning scheme shall, if such person makes a claim 
within the time, if any, limited by the scheme (such time not being less 
than 6 months after the date when notice of the approval of the scheme 
is published in the manner prescribed by the regulations), be entitled to 
obtain compensation in respect thereof from the responsible 
authority . . . .322
 
 318. See Kettering Pty. Ltd. v. Noosa Shire Council, (2004) 134 L.G.E.R.A. 99, 110–
11 (Austl.). 
 319. Id. 
 320. For a relatively recent review that includes discussion of many of the state law 
provisions for such compensation, see EMILY CRIPPS, CARL BINNING & MIKE YOUNG, 
OPPORTUNITY DENIED: REVIEW OF THE LEGISLATIVE ABILITY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT TO 
CONSERVE NATIVE VEGETATION (1999), available at http://www.deh.gov.au/land/publicat 
ions/opportunities/pubs/oppden.pdf. 
 321. Town Planning and Development Act, 1928 (W. Austl.).  
 322. Id. § 11(1). An interesting feature of the Act is the “betterment” provision that 
authorizes sharing of the benefit if a land use planning scheme increases the value of the 
land. Although not apparently utilized, the “betterment” provision provides: 
Whenever, by the expenditure of money by the responsible authority in the 
making and carrying out of any town planning scheme, any land or property is 
within 12 months of the completion of the work, or of the section of the work 
affecting such land, as the case may be, increased in value, the responsible au-
thority shall be entitled to recover from any person whose land or property is so 
increased in value, one half of the amount of such increase. 
Id. § 11(2). 
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The term “injurious affection” has often been difficult to interpret and 
apply,323 and other statutes have clarified the bases for compensation. 
For example, Victoria’s Planning and Environment Act, 1987324 states: 
98. Right to compensation 
(1) The owner or occupier of any land may claim compensation from 
the planning authority for financial loss suffered as the natural, direct 
and reasonable consequence of ― 
(a) the land being reserved for a public purpose under a planning 
scheme; 
. . . . 
(2) The owner or occupier of any land may claim compensation from a 
responsible authority for financial loss suffered as the natural, direct 
and reasonable consequence of a refusal by the responsible authority to 
grant a permit to use or develop the land on the ground that the land is 
or will be needed for a public purpose.325
Queensland’s Integrated Planning Act, 1997326 provides compensation 
in regard to development or changes in a planning scheme in the follow-
ing circumstances: 
5.4.2 Compensation for reduced value of interest in land 
An owner of an interest in land is entitled to be paid reasonable com-
pensation327 by a local government if ― 
(a) a change reduces the value of the interest; and 
(b) a development application (superseded planning scheme) for a de-
velopment permit relating to the land has been made; and 
(c) the application is assessed having regard to the planning scheme and 
planning scheme policies in effect when the application was made; and 
(d) the assessment manager, or, on appeal, the court ― 
(i) refuses the application; or      
(ii) approves the application in part or subject to conditions or both in 
part and subject to conditions. 
 
 323. See, e.g., Cornell v. Town of East Fremantle, (2003) W.A.S.C. 163 (W. Austl.). 
 324. Planning and Environmental Act, 1987 (Vict.). 
 325. Id. § 98. 
 326. Integrated Planning Act, 1997, ch. 5 (Queensl.). 
 327. It is important to note that the legislation does not provide for “full” or “just” 
compensation. 
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5.4.3 Compensation for interest in land being changed to public pur-
pose 
An owner of an interest in land is entitled to be paid reasonable com-
pensation by a local government if because of a change, the only pur-
pose for which the land could be used (other than the purpose for which 
it was lawfully being used when the change was made) is for a public 
purpose.328
Compensation may also be available in legislation regulating areas for 
nature protection. Tasmania’s Threatened Species Protection Act of 
1995329 creates the following compensation scheme: 
45. Compensation 
(1) A landholder is entitled to compensation for financial loss suffered 
directly resulting from an interim protection order or a land manage-
ment agreement. 
(2) A person who is required to comply with a notice under section 36 
is entitled to compensation for financial loss as a result of being re-
quired to comply with that notice. 
(3) The holder of a license, permit or other authority limited under sec-
tion 38 is entitled to compensation for financial loss. 
. . . .      
(6) In making a determination [of compensation], the Minister must 
have regard to the following matters: 
(a) the amount by which the value of the land will be increased or de-
creased as a result of the interim protection order; 
(b) the amount of financial loss, including loss of profit, loss occa-
sioned by breach of contract, loss of production and other consequential 
loss, to the landholder or other person which would result from compli-
ance with the order; 
(c) any increase in the value of the land which would result from the 
carrying out of works for the purposes of this Act; 
(d) the cost of any works required to be carried out on the land; 
(e) any change in the value of chattels or improvements which would 
occur because the land use or activity to which they relate is to be re-
stricted or prohibited by the order; 
(f) any other matter which the Minister considers relevant.330
 
 328. Integrated Planning Act, 1997, ch. 5 §§ 5.4.2–5.4.3.  
 329. Threatened Species Protection Act, 1995 (Tas.). 
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Similarly, Queensland’s Nature Conservation Act, 1992331 provides 
compensation under the following circumstances: 
67. Compensation when protected area declared 
(1) This section applies if― 
(a) a nature refuge is declared under section 49; or 
(b) a regulation giving effect to a management plan for a World Heri-
tage management area or international agreement area commences. 
(2) If a land holder’s interest in land is injuriously affected by a restric-
tion or prohibition imposed under the declaration or regulation on the 
land holder’s existing use of the land, the land holder is entitled to be 
paid by the State the reasonable compensation because of the restriction 
or prohibition that is agreed between the State and the land holder or, 
failing agreement, decided by the Land Court.332
The provision for compensation in a number of state land use and envi-
ronmental statutes has not made property rights and regulatory taking 
less controversial in Australia. Recent High Court decisions confirming 
the right of states to acquire property without full compensation333 and 
the ability of states to condition subdivision and development of land on 
the transfer of property to the government334 have heightened concerns 
of property rights advocates as states have increasingly pursued land use 
and environmental regulation to protect biodiversity, sensitive ecosys-
tems, and cultural heritage.335 Environmental advocates, on the other 
hand, feel that providing compensation for regulation of land raises seri-
ous policy issues, including creating an expectation of compensation for 
regulation in spite of the public interests at stake and creating a climate 
that inhibits effective regulation because of the financial conse-
quences.336 But the controversy about the availability of compensation 
for regulations affecting land value is fought out primarily in the political 
process in Australian states, rather than in the courts. 
 
 330. Id. § 45.  
 331. Nature Conservation Act, 1992 (Queensl.). 
 332. Id. § 67.  
 333. See Durham Holdings, (2001) 205 C.L.R. at 399. 
 334. See W. Austl. Planning Comm’n v. Temwood, (2004) 221 C.L.R. 30 (Austl.). 
 335. See, e.g., COALITION FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS, PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER ATTACK IN 
WESTERN AUSTRALIA (2004), available at http://propertycouncil.gravitymax.com.au/ 
advoc/page.asp?622=249054&E_Page=17720. 
 336. See, e.g., AUSTRALIAN NETWORK OF ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE OFFICES, EDO 
SUBMISSION IN RESPONSE TO THE PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION DRAFT REPORT INTO THE 
IMPACTS OF NATIVE VEGETATION & BIODIVERSITY REGULATIONS (2004), available at 
http://www.edo.org.au/edonsw/site/pdf/productivity_commission_draft_report.pdf. 
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C. Canada: A (Very) Limited Foray into Regulatory Taking 
The Canadian experience in finding compensable regulatory takings, 
usually referred to in Canadian cases and literature as de facto expropria-
tion, is extremely limited.337 Two cases in addition to Tener338 have 
found a compensable regulatory taking in the land use context.339 
Casamiro Resource Corp. v. British Columbia340 and Rock Resources, 
Inc. v. British Columbia341 are remarkably similar to Tener in that the 
cases involved the loss of the right to exploit Crown-granted mineral 
rights within a provincial park.342 The majority opinion of the Canadian 
Supreme Court in Tener characterized the situation as the recovery by 
the Crown of an interest in land, i.e., the access rights which were neces-
sary to recover the minerals, without which the claims were “virtually 
useless.”343 The court in Casamiro found the factual circumstances were 
equivalent to Tener’s and that the mineral rights had been reduced to 
“meaningless pieces of paper.”344 In Rock Resources, although the inter-
est taken was classified as personalty, the court relied on Tener’s analysis 
 
 337. “A de facto expropriation, or as it is known in United States constitutional law, 
regulatory taking, does not have a long history or clearly articulated basis in Canadian 
law.” Mariner Real Estate Ltd. v. Nova Scotia, [1999] 177 D.L.R.4th 696, 712 
(N.S.C.A.). 
 338. See supra Part II.C, for a discussion of the Tener decision. 
 339. In Canada, only five cases have found regulation of property rights a compensable 
expropriation of property. Three of these cases involved the extinguishment of mining 
rights by the creation of parks. The groundbreaking case was the decision of the Cana-
dian Supreme Court in Manitoba Fisheries Ltd. v. The Queen, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 101, 
which required compensation for appropriation of the good will of a fish exporting firm 
when federal legislation created a monopoly in a statutory corporation to carry on such a 
business. In that case, the Supreme Court applied the maxim that compensation should be 
given if property is expropriated unless the statute clearly manifests the intention not to 
compensate. Professor Hogg notes that the “Crown corporation had in effect acquired the 
business of exporting fish,” and therefore arguably had acquired something. HOGG, supra 
note 166, § 28.5(d). Another case has held that destroying contract rights can be equiva-
lent to taking property, and, relying on Manitoba Fisheries, awarded compensation. See 
Wells v. Newfoundland, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 199 (Can.). 
 340. [1991] 80 D.L.R.4th 1 (B.C.C.A.). 
 341. [2003] 229 D.L.R.4th 115 (B.C.C.A.). 
 342. Id. 
 343. Tener, [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 563–64. In Casamiro, the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal noted that in both Tener and Casamiro, the owner of the Crown-granted mineral 
claims had the right to the use and occupation of the surface, a right ancillary to the grant 
of a fee simple, a right granted by statute, and a right also in the nature of a profit a pren-
dre. The surface rights were referred to in the Tener grants, but there was no Crown grant 
of the surface in either case. Casamiro, 80 D.L.R.4th at 19–20. 
 344. Id. at 22. 
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to find a taking.345 These cases create extremely limited circumstances in 
which a right to compensation has been recognized, and Canadian courts 
have rejected expansion of the doctrine in the realm of land use regula-
tion beyond the narrow scope of these cases. 
Initially, de facto expropriation cases must be distinguished from “ad-
ministrative law challenges to the legality or appropriateness of planning 
decisions.”346 Similar to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lingle,347 
the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Mariner Real Estate identified the 
issue in such circumstances as not whether the regulation constitutes an 
expropriation, but whether the regulation was is lawfully enacted and not 
ultra vires.348 Further, in Hartel Holdings Co. Ltd. v. Council of City of 
Calgary,349 the Supreme Court of Canada stated that it is “clear that mu-
nicipalities cannot abuse their powers by using them for an improper pur-
pose.”350 Such actions do not give rise to a claim of de facto expropria-
tion, however, but to damages for tort. 
 
 345. Rock Resources, 229 D.L.R.4th at 155. A fourth mineral rights case, Cream Silver 
Mines Ltd. v. British Columbia, [1993] 99 D.L.R.4th 199 (B.C.C.A.), denied compensa-
tion to the holder of mineral claims within a provincial park because Cream Silver held 
only “bare mineral claims” which were not registerable and did not include absolute ac-
cess rights. Unlike the Crown-granted mineral rights granted in Tener and Casamiro, bare 
mineral claims are not considered “land” for purposes of the Park Act which expressly 
provided for expropriation of land with compensation. In Chief Justice Finch’s opinion in 
Rock Resources, he argued that Manitoba Fisheries did not distinguish personalty and 
realty in applying a presumption that the legislature intends compensation when property 
rights are taken. Rock Resources, 229 D.L.R.4th at 152. 
 346. Mariner Real Estate Ltd., 177 D.L.R.4th at 717–18; see also Canadian Pacific 
Railway Co. v. Vancouver (City), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 227 (Can.) (challenging a land use 
regulation as beyond the city’s statutory authority and subject to procedural irregulari-
ties). 
 347. See supra text accompanying notes 268–76, for a discussion of Lingle. 
 348. Mariner Real Estate Ltd., 177 D.L.R.4th at 717. 
 349. [1984] 1 S.C.R. 337 (Can.). 
 350. Id. at 354. The Supreme Court provided the following examples in the case of 
down-zoning: 
For example, in Tegon Developments Ltd. v. Edmonton (City of) (1977), 5 
Alta. L.R. (2d) 63 (C.A.), affirmed [1979] 1 S.C.R. 98, the Edmonton City 
Council was disallowed from putting a freeze on the development of certain 
property in the hope that the province would designate the property under The 
Alberta Heritage Act. Similarly, in Hauff v. Vancouver (City of) (1980), 12 
M.P.L.R. 125, the City of Vancouver’s attempt to pass a by-law for the express 
purpose of limiting property values with an eye to future acquisition was struck 
down. 
Id. at 355. It should be noted that it is not considered bad faith to freeze zoning or further 
development in anticipation of subsequent acquisition of the land. So long as the actions 
are taken pursuant to a legitimate and valid planning purpose, “the resulting detriment to 
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The lack of a constitutional grounding for a right to compensation in 
Canada for government expropriation of property means that any right 
must found in the common law, a statute, or a rule of statutory interpreta-
tion. Eric C. E. Todd writes, however, that “[i]t has never been suggested 
that there was a common law right to compensation” in Canada.351 The 
leading case on the issue, Sisters of Charity of Rockingham v. The 
King,352 unambiguously states that “[c]ompensation claims are statutory 
and depend on statutory provisions. No owner of lands expropriated by 
statute for public purposes is entitled to compensation . . . unless he can 
establish a statutory right.”353
The first step in the analysis of a compensation claim, then, is to de-
termine whether the government action is undertaken pursuant to a rele-
vant statute authorizing the expropriation of property with compensation. 
If the statute does not provide for compensation, however, Sisters of 
Charity does not stand for the proposition that no compensation is due 
because the statute failed to provide explicitly for compensation. The 
rule of statutory interpretation that “unless the words of the statute 
clearly so demand,354 a statute is not to be construed so as to take away 
the property of a subject without compensation”355 reflects the British 
tradition that “[t]he Legislature cannot fairly be supposed to intend, in 
the absence of clear words shewing [sic] such intention, that one man’s 
property shall be confiscated for the benefit of others, or of the pub-
lic.”356 Nevertheless, the government always has the prerogative “to 
override or disregard this ordinary principle”357 through clearly ex-
pressed intent.358 For example, the British Columbia Local Government 
 
the appellant is one that must be endured in the public interest.” Id. at 354. The Canadian 
Supreme Court has held that such planned acquisitions can be legitimate reasons for re-
fusal of building permits or rezoning applications. See id. 
 351. See TODD, supra note 63, at 35. 
 352. [1922] 2 A.C. 315 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Can.). 
 353. Id. at 322. In one case, however, the court discussed a principle it referred to as 
“the common law right to compensation for interference with a subject’s property.” 
France Fenwick & Co. v. The King, [1927] 1 K.B. 458, 467 (U.K.).   
 354. Apparently, a statute may “clearly so demand” that no compensation be afforded 
without expressly stating that proposition. For example, in Cream Silver Mines, Justice 
Southin rejected turning a “rule of statutory construction” into a common law rule con-
cerning compensation, where the comprehensive Park Act had few express provisions for 
compensation. Cream Silver Mines, [1993] 99 D.L.R.4th at 208.  
 355. De Keyser’s Royal Hotel, Ltd., [1920] A.C. at 542. 
 356. Id. 
 357. Id. 
 358. See Authorson v. Canada (Att’y General), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 40 (Can.); R. v. Ap-
pleby (No. 2), [1976] 15 N.B.R.2d 650 (N.B.C.A.).  
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Act359 provides that “[c]ompensation is not payable to any person for any 
reduction in the value of that person’s interest in land, or for any loss or 
damages that result from the adoption of an official community plan or a 
bylaw under this Division or the issue of a [development] permit under 
Division 9 of this part.”360 When the intent of the legislative body is ex-
pressed this clearly, there is no room for interpretation. 
The determination that compensation is available under a relevant 
statutory authority if the government expropriates property still leaves 
unanswered the questions of whether the interest allegedly expropriated 
is “property” and of whether a regulation that does not involve the gov-
ernment actually taking possession or occupying land will constitute a 
taking or de facto expropriation of land or an interest in land. Because 
most claims for compensation for land use regulations are brought under 
land expropriation acts,361 an initial issue often is whether the property 
claimed to be taken is “land” or an interest in land within the meaning of 
those acts.362 Expropriations acts are considered remedial statutes, and 
common law rules of interpretation dictate that such statutes must be 
given broad and liberal interpretation consistent with their purpose and 
be strictly construed in favor of the parties who rights are affected.363 
Neither zoning of land uses in a community or “regulation of specific 
activity on certain land,” however, are considered to affect an interest of 
an owner in the land.364 In Belfast Corp. v. O.D. Cars Ltd.,365 which is 
favorably cited on a regular basis by Canadian courts, Viscount Simonds 
 
 359. R.S.B.C., ch. 323 (1996) (Can.). 
 360. Id. § 914(1). A number of other Canadian jurisdictions also have zoning or plan-
ning legislation containing such express limitations on compensation. See, e.g., Planning 
Act, R.S.N.S., ch. 346 (1989) (N.S.); The Planning Act, R.S.A., ch. P-9 (1980) (Alta.); 
Agricultural Land Commission Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 36 (1979) (B.C.); The Planning and 
Development Act, R.S.S., ch. P-13 (1978) (Sask.); The Planning Act, C.C.S.M., ch. P-80 
(1975) (Man.). 
 361. See supra text accompanying notes 65–67. 
 362. Canadian expropriation acts generally also provide compensation for “injurious 
affection” of land. Although property owners often make broader claims of the meaning 
the term, the term can only be applied as defined within the relevant act. In general, com-
pensation for injurious affection only applies to damage to retained land when there has 
been a formal expropriation of land. See TODD, supra note 63, at 25. 
 363. See Dell Holdings Ltd. v. Toronto Area Transit Operating Auth., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 
32, 44–45 (Can.). But see TODD, supra note 63, at 25–26 (“As Lord Pearson pointed out 
in Rugby Water Board v. Shaw Fox there are no common law principles in the law of 
expropriation. . . . [C]ompulsory acquisition and compensation for it are entirely creatures 
of statute.”). 
 364. See Tener, [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 564. 
 365. [1960] A.C. 490 (U.K.) (determining whether denial of a development permit 
under a Northern Ireland planning law constituted a taking of land). 
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contested that “the right to use property in a particular way was itself 
property,”366 but even if the word “‘property’ is given wide import,” he 
stated that “any one of those rights which in the aggregate constituted 
ownership of property could [not] itself and by itself aptly be called 
‘property.’”367 This has been found to be true in Canada, even in cases 
where land development is blocked or frozen.368 Justice Estey’s state-
ment in Tener that “compensation does not follow zoning either up or 
down”369 has become a virtual mantra for Canadian courts.370
Closely related is the well-established principle in Canadian jurispru-
dence that even significant and dramatic loss of value of the land by zon-
ing, by refusal to rezone or to grant development or subdivision ap-
proval, or by freezing development pursuant to planning powers alone is 
not enough to establish a de facto expropriation.371 “It is well settled that 
owners may be compelled to surrender some value or future value of 
their land to the local authority and no price has to be paid.”372 Professor 
Hogg points out that: 
[m]ost forms of regulation impose costs on those who are regulated, 
and it would be intolerably costly to compensate them.373 Moreover, 
much regulation has a redistributive purpose, it is designed to limit the 
rights of one group . . . and increase the rights of another . . . . A com-
 
 366. Id. at 517. 
 367. Id. This statement can be compared to the U.S. Penn Central case where the Su-
preme Court held that a diminution in the value of property must be determined in rela-
tion to the nature and extent of the interference with the rights in the parcel as a whole. 
Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130.  
 368. See Hartel Holdings Co. Ltd. v. Council of City of Calgary, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 337 
(Can.); Soo Mill & Lumber Co. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City), [1975] 2 S.C.R. 78 (Can.); 
Sanbay Developments Ltd. v. London (City), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 485 (Can.). 
 369. Tener, [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 557. 
 370. See, e.g., Ghalioungui v. Mississauga, [2005] 138 A.C.W.S.3d 769 (Ont. Super. 
Ct.); Alberta (Minister of Public Works) v. Nilsson, [2002] 118 A.C.W.S.3d 399 (Alta. 
C.A.); Mariner Real Estate Ltd. v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), [1999] 177 D.L.R.4th 
696, 715 (N.S.C.A.); Harvard Investments Ltd. v. Winnipeg (City), [1995] 107 Man. 
R.2d 114, 120 (Man. C.A.); Steer Holdings Ltd. v. Manitoba, [1992] 79 Man. R.2d 169, 
179 (Man. Q.B.); Salvation Army, Canada East v. Ontario (Minister of Government Ser-
vices), [1986] 53 O.R.2d 704, 708–09 (Ont. C.A.); see also IAN ROGERS, CANADIAN LAW 
OF PLANNING AND ZONING 124 (2000) (stating that “[t]he law permits the appropriation of 
prospective development rights for the good of the community, but allows the property 
owner nothing in return”).  
 371. See TODD, supra note 63, at 22–23. 
 372. See ROGERS, supra note 370, at 124. 
 373. This sentiment was seconded by Justice Holmes in Mahon where he stated that 
“[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not 
be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.” Mahon, 260 
U.S. at 413. 
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pensation regime would work at cross-purposes to the purpose of the 
regulation. Nevertheless, there is an indistinct boundary between regu-
lating and taking.374
In Mariner Real Estate,375 Justice Cromwell of the Nova Scotia Court 
of Appeal noted that “the loss of economic value of land is not the loss of 
an interest in land within the meaning of the Expropriation Act.”376 Al-
though Tener is sometimes characterized as standing for the proposition 
that a taking occurs when the regulation leaves the land with virtually no 
economic value, Justice Cromwell more aptly characterized the case as 
requiring a “virtual extinction of an identifiable interest in land.”377 The 
court opined that although severe loss of economic value might be evi-
dence of the loss of “virtually all the normal incidents of ownership, 
. . . [i]t is not, however, the decline in market value that constitutes the 
loss of an interest in land, but the taking away of the incidents of owner-
ship reflected in that decline.”378 This interpretation is consistent with the 
Canadian Supreme Court’s statement in Tener that “[e]xpropriation or 
compulsory taking occurs if the Crown or a public authority acquires 
from the owner an interest in property.”379
In Harvard Investments Ltd. v. Winnipeg (City),380 Justice Twaddle of 
the Manitoba Court of Appeal described Tener as establishing “two ele-
ments to a [regulatory] taking: (i) the acquisition of an asset by the au-
thority involved or its designate, and (ii) the complete extinguishment of 
the asset’s value to the owner.”381 This test incorporates the final tenet of 
Canadian takings jurisprudence, as enunciated in Steer Holdings: 
For there to be a statutory taking which gives rise to a claim for com-
pensation, not only must the owner be deprived of the benefit in its 
property, there must also be a resulting enhancement or improvement 
conferred upon whatever entity the Legislature intended to benefit. 
Something must not only be taken away, it must be taken over.382
 
 374. HOGG, supra note 166, § 28.5(d). 
 375. Mariner Real Estate Ltd. v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), [1999] 177 
D.L.R.4th 696 (N.S.C.A.). 
 376. Id. at 724. 
 377. Id. at 728; see also 64933 Manitoba Ltd. v. Manitoba, [2002] 214 D.L.R.4th 37, 
41 (Man. C.A.) (holding that “a ‘de facto’ expropriation made by government can give 
rise to an entitlement to compensation, but only if the effect of the government’s action is 
to essentially extinguish the claimant’s interest in land or property”). 
 378. Mariner Real Estate Ltd., 177 D.L.R.4th at 727. 
 379. Tener, [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 556. 
 380. [1995] 107 Man. R.2d 114 (Man. C.A.). 
 381. Id. at 122. 
 382. Steer Holdings, [1992] 79 Man. R.2d at 174–75.  
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Other cases have also used language referring to the requirement that 
an expropriation requires the “enhancement or benefit” of public prop-
erty.383 The nature of the enhancement or benefit the government must 
acquire is, however, far from clear. In Tener, Justice Estey seemed to 
distinguish a confiscatory taking from usual land use regulation by stat-
ing that “[t]he imposition of zoning regulation and the regulation of ac-
tivities on lands . . . add[s] nothing to the value of public property.”384 
But the context of the statement was to distinguish the purpose of the 
denial of Tener’s permit, i.e., “the action taken . . . was to enhance the 
value of the public park,”385 from the purposes of a legitimate land use 
regulation. Significantly, the Supreme Court in Tener also found that a 
legal interest―a right of access that was part of the mineral grant―had 
been recovered by the government.386
In Mariner Real Estate, the property owner argued that “where regula-
tion enhances the value of public land, the regulation constitutes the ac-
quisition of an interest in land.”387 There the private property had been 
designated as “beach” and protected under the Beaches Act.388 Permits 
for even single-family dwellings had been denied by the Minister. The 
property owners asserted that the protection of beaches and dunes for 
environmental and recreational purposes created a public benefit and en-
hanced the value of public beaches seaward of the high-water line.389 
Relying on Tener and favorably citing the Australian High Court in New-
crest Mining, Justice Cromwell of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal con-
cluded that “for there to be a taking, there must be, in effect, . . . an ac-
quisition of an interest in land and that enhanced value is not such an 
interest.”390 Similarly, in Steer Holdings, Justice Kroft of the Manitoba 
Court of Appeals granted the likelihood that blocking the development in 
that case “enhanced” a nearby public park and that preventing interfer-
ence with a creek by construction served the “public interest.” He as-
serted, however, that “[t]his acknowledgment is not . . . tantamount to a 
finding that there has been the kind of confiscation and transferring of 
 
 383. See, e.g., 64933 Manitoba Ltd., [2002] 214 D.L.R.4th at 41–42 (“For there to be a 
statutory taking which gives rise to a claim for compensation, not only must the owner be 
deprived of the benefit in its property, there must also be a resulting enhancement or im-
provement conferred upon whatever entity the legislature intended to benefit.”). 
 384. Tener, [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 564. 
 385. Id. 
 386. Id. at 563–64. But see HOGG, supra note 166, § 28.5(d) (asserting that “[i]n Tener, 
the Crown acquired nothing”). 
 387. Mariner Real Estate Ltd., 177 D.L.R.4th at 730. 
 388. R.S.N.S., ch. 32 (1989) (Can.). 
 389. Mariner Real Estate Ltd., 177 D.L.R.4th at 701–02. 
 390. Id. at 732. 
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interest or benefit of the kind found by the Supreme Court in either 
Manitoba Fisheries or Tener”391 and found no legally recognized benefit 
had been transferred to the government or its beneficiary. 
The Supreme Court of Canada most recently addressed de facto taking 
in Canadian Pacific Railway v. Vancouver (City).392 The unanimously 
adopted decision reinforced the approach of the provincial courts in as-
sessing whether land use regulation would generally require compensa-
tion for diminution of economic value, but added little to the jurispru-
dence of regulatory taking in Canada. The City of Vancouver had 
adopted an official development plan (ODP) which designated a former 
railway corridor owned by Canadian Pacific Railway Co. (CPR), the 
“only such intact corridor existing in Vancouver,”393 as a public thor-
oughfare for transportation. The OPR effectively froze the redevelop-
ment potential of the land, limiting the land to uses such as greenways, 
cycle paths, and nature trails.394 CPR argued that all reasonable use of its 
land had been taken and that it is presumed that the Legislature does not 
intend to take property without compensation.395
The Supreme Court stated that two requirements must be met to estab-
lish a de facto taking: “(1) an acquisition of a beneficial interest in the 
property or flowing from it, and (2) removal of all reasonable uses of the 
property.”396 With little analysis, the court found that neither requirement 
had been made out by CPR.397 The court acknowledged that CPR did not 
have to establish that the city had accomplished a forced transfer of 
property, if the city acquired a “beneficial interest related to the prop-
erty.”398 CPR argued that the city had gained a de facto park because of 
the limitations on the use. The court concluded, however, that “[t]he  
City . . . gained nothing more than some assurance that the land will be 
used or developed in accordance with its vision, without even precluding 
the historical or current use of the land, . . . not the sort of benefit that 
can be construed as a taking.”399 Further, the court found that all reason-
able uses of the land had not be removed by the law. CPR could continue 
to use the land for a railway, could lease the land, or enter into pub-
 
 391. Steer Holdings, [1992] 79 Man. R.2d at 177. 
 392. 2006 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 5 (Feb. 23, 2006). For an excellent discussion of this 
case, see Russell Brown, The Constructive Taking at the Supreme Court of Canada: 
Once More, Without Feeling, 40 U.B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (Can.).  
 393. Canadian Pacific Railway, 2006 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 5, at *22. 
 394. Id. at *8. 
 395. Id. at *19–20. 
 396. Id. at *20. 
 397. Id.  
 398. Id. 
 399. Id. at *21. 
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lic/private partnerships. The court even characterized the OPR as “ex-
pand[ing] upon the only use the land has known in recent history.”400
The Supreme Court of Canada was equally dismissive of CPR’s argu-
ment concerning the presumption in favor of compensation and the ap-
plication of the provincial Expropriation Act.401 In granting planning and 
zoning authority to the city, the provincial legislature anticipated effects 
on property value and in section 569 of the Vancouver Charter provided 
that in such cases the property shall be deemed not to have been taken 
and “no compensation shall be payable.”402 The court found that even if 
the facts supported a finding of a de facto taking in the case, the provi-
sions of the Charter conclusively negated any inference of a compensable 
taking.403
The province’s Expropriation Act404 provides, however, that “[i]f an 
expropriating authority proposes to expropriate land, th[e] Act applies to 
[require compensation] and, if there is an inconsistency between any of 
the provisions of th[e] Act and any other enactment respecting the ex-
propriation, the provisions of [the Expropriation Act] apply.”405 The 
court explained that the provisions the Vancouver Charter did not 
amount to an inconsistency, because the Expropriation Act does not ap-
ply unless there has been a taking. By statutorily deeming adverse affects 
on property by zoning and planning regulations not to constitute a taking 
or expropriation, the Charter removes any possibility of inconsistency 
and application of the Expropriation Act.406   
V. CONCLUSION 
The cases attributed with introducing the concept of regulatory taking 
to land use law in the United States, Australia, and Canada were all cases 
involving mineral rights that had been extinguished. The laws involved 
did not explicitly acquire an interest in the property and therefore fall 
generally within the scope of what we refer to as regulatory taking, but 
these cases do differ from typical land use regulation and perhaps pro-
vide poor examples of regulation that simply devalues or restricts use of 
land. By denying access to the minerals in those cases, the governments 
 
 400. Canadian Pacific Railway, 2006 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 5, at *22. 
 401. Id. 
 402. Id. at *15. 
 403. Id. at *22–24. 
 404. British Columbia Expropriation Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 125 (1996). 
 405. Id. § 2(1). 
 406. Canadian Pacific Railway, 2006 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 5, at *23–24. 
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took away the only thing of value407 to the owners of the mineral 
rights―the ability to take possession of the minerals. U.S. cases have 
often referred to the right to exclude as an essential or fundamental prop-
erty right,408 but in the case of tangible property, the right to possess 
seems to be an even more indispensable characteristic of property. 
Whether these mineral rights cases are viewed as totally diminishing the 
use or value of the property interest or denying the owner the fundamen-
tal right of possession, they present circumstances that are relatively rare 
in the context of planning, zoning, and environmental regulation. 
The case law provides virtually no evidence that Australian or Cana-
dian courts have accepted the concept of regulatory taking in the general 
context of land use and environmental law. In both Newcrest Mining and 
Tener, in addition to finding a complete diminution of value or limitation 
on use by the owners, the courts found an acquisition of a property inter-
est by the government, arguably removing these cases from realm of pure 
regulatory taking.409 In Tener, the Canadian Supreme Court carefully 
distinguished the case from land use planning and zoning,410 and no Ca-
nadian case has found a compensable taking in the application of general 
land use planning or developments controls. In Australia, the Tasmanian 
Dam Case provides the most relevant precedent to apply to land use 
regulation, and that case is generally cited for proposition that mere regu-
 
 407. This statement is based on Justice Holmes’ view of the factual situation in Mahon. 
Justice Holmes characterized the Kohler Act in Mahon as resulting in a total diminution 
of the value of the coal company’s affected mineral rights or support estate, and not a 
partial diminution of value of all the coal company’s interests. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 19–22. This kind of conceptual severance has been rejected in later U.S. taking 
jurisprudence. For example, in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictus, 480 
U.S. 470 (1987), a Pennsylvania statute similar to the one in Mahon was found not to 
constitute a taking. The coal that could not be mined to avoid subsidence could not be 
considered separately, but only in the context of the company’s entire coal holdings. The 
coal that had to be left in place amounted to only a small percentage of the overall hold-
ings, and the diminution of value was not sufficient to constitute a taking. Id. at 495–96; 
see also Penn Central Transp. Co., 436 U.S. at 130–31. In the end, Mahon’s ongoing 
influence is in Justice Holmes’ powerful rhetoric rather than in its providing a strong 
precedent based on the facts of the case. 
 408. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (The right to exclude 
is “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly character-
ized as property.”); see also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 
(1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982). 
 409. Newcrest Mining, (1997) 190 C.L.R. at 634; Tener, [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 565; see 
also Evans, Constitutional Property Rights, supra note 300, at 200 (“The [High] Court 
has not accepted the American regulatory takings doctrine.”). 
 410. Tener, [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 563. 
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lation of land, even regulation that requires the property to be maintained 
in its natural state, does not require compensation.411
The emphasis in Australia and Canada on compensation depending 
upon an acquisition of property or a beneficial interest in property by 
government reflects British, rather than American, tradition. The ultimate 
reliance of Australian and Canadian courts in hinging their holdings upon 
a finding of whether the government receives a benefit or acquires a 
property interest, however, leaves a back door open for finding a com-
pensable regulatory taking. The words “acquire” and “property” are pe-
culiarly indeterminate in a legal sense. They are broad and malleable 
terms that may provide a surrogate for balancing public and private in-
terests when the court adjudges, as in cases like Newcrest Mining and 
Tener, that the regulation “goes too far.”  
The balancing inherent in regulatory taking analysis is not just a bal-
ancing of private property rights against the public interest. It is also a 
balancing of the role of courts with the role of legislatures. Canada’s lack 
of a constitutional mandate for compensation in the case of compulsory 
taking of property and its doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty make the 
role of the court clear and narrow. In Mariner Real Estate, Justice 
Cromwell of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal explained as follows: 
De facto expropriation is conceptually difficult given the narrow pa-
rameters of the court’s authority . . . . While de facto expropriation is 
concerned with whether the “rights” of ownership have been taken 
away, those rights are defined only by reference to lawful uses of land 
which may, by law, be severely restricted. In short, the bundle of rights 
associated with ownership carries with it the possibility of stringent 
land use regulation. . . . Canadian courts have no . . . broad mandate to 
review and vary legislative judgments about the appropriate distribu-
tion of burdens and benefits flowing from environmental or other land 
use controls. In Canada, the courts’ task is to determine whether the 
regulation in question entitles the respondents to compensation under 
the Expropriation Act, not to pass judgment on the way the Legislature 
apportions the burdens flowing from land use regulation.412
Australia’s courts are similarly constrained in reviewing land use regula-
tions enacted by state parliaments.413 At the federal level in Australia and 
at both the state and federal levels in the United States, however, the 
courts find themselves in different role when reviewing the effects of 
legislation on constitutionally guaranteed rights. But it seems that these 
 
 411. Tasmanian Dam Case, 158 C.L.R. at 145–46. 
 412. Mariner Real Estate Ltd., 177 D.L.R.4th at 712–13. 
 413. See supra text accompanying note 309. 
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roles are distinctly different in Australia and the United States. The Tas-
manian Dam Case demonstrates that the High Court’s review will gener-
ally be limited to the questions of whether the government acquired land 
or an interest in land through its authority under section 51(xxxi)414 and, 
if so, whether the legislation provided just terms.415 In applying the 
analysis outlined by the Supreme Court in Penn Central,416 U.S. courts, 
on the other hand, find themselves re-evaluating the legislature’s balanc-
ing of private property rights and the public interest served by a land use 
regulation, a role inconsistent with the British legal tradition inherited by 
Australia and Canada. Even U.S. courts, however, will not apply a 
heightened substantive due process analysis reserved for regulation af-
fecting fundamental rights. 
In Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co.,417 the U.S. Supreme Court 
stated that “while the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, 
the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new 
and different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of 
their operation. In a changing world, it is impossible that it should be 
otherwise.”418 Even if property is not considered a fundamental right, the 
constitutionalization of property has made it difficult for U.S. courts to 
evolve a view of property that conforms to the current conditions in a 
now densely developed country where external environmental impacts 
are better understood and quality of life and ecological integrity are often 
difficult to preserve without government intervention. With no constitu-
tional restraint on Canada’s regulators, however, their courts can demon-
strate considerable pragmatism concerning land use regulation as illus-
trated in Mariner Real Estate, where Justice Cromwell stated: 
Considerations of a claim of de facto expropriation must recognize that 
the effect of the particular regulation must be compared with reason-
 
 414. It should be noted, however, that Australia’s High Court may never get to this 
step of its analysis if the acquisition of property is found to be outside the scope of sec-
tion 51(xxxi). In many ways, the analysis of this “complex and contested” issue substi-
tutes for the balancing analysis applied by U.S. courts in regulatory taking analysis both 
in terms of the relevant substantive principles and its theoretical underpinnings. See Ev-
ans, Constitutional Property Rights, supra note 300, at 202–07. In fact, Professor Evans 
has proposed a test for determining whether an acquisition of property is within the scope 
of the section 51(xxxi) requirement of just terms that explicitly balances the effect of 
regulation on private property against the legitimate public interests served, a test that 
rings of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Penn Central analysis. See Evans, Acquisition of Prop-
erty, supra note 282, at 203. 
 415. See supra text accompanying notes 292–99. 
 416. Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124–25. 
 417. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 418. Id. at 387. 
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able use of the lands in modern Canada, not with their use as if they 
were in some imaginary state of nature unconstrained by regulation. In 
modern Canada, extensive land use regulation is the norm and it should 
not be assumed that ownership carries with it any exemption from such 
regulation.419
Although Australia’s Constitution does provide protection for property 
at the federal level, the requirement that the government actually acquire 
a property interest or benefit leaves the government substantial freedom 
to regulate property up to the point where there is “an effective sterilisa-
tion of the rights constituting the property.”420 Thus, for loss of value of 
land through “mere” regulation of land use, property owners find little 
protection in Australia’s Constitution.421
Finally, whether property is protected by a common law presumption 
of compensation, a statutory scheme, or a constitutional guarantee, all 
three countries continue to recognize the importance of private property 
in their societies.422 In all three countries, compensation is generally 
available when land is physically acquired. And in all three countries, 
there are vigorous proponents of expanded protection of property rights. 
But while the concept of regulatory taking is, at most, extremely limited 
in Australian and Canadian jurisprudence, it is also not so fully realized 
in the United States that limited effects of regulation on the use or value 
of land must be compensated. In all three countries, when regulation falls 
short of actually acquiring or “sterilizing” property rights in land, it is the 
legislatures, rather than the courts, who bear primary responsibility for 
balancing society’s interests with property rights. 
 
 419. Mariner Real Estate Ltd., 177 D.L.R.4th at 717. 
 420. Newcrest Mining, (1997) 190 C.L.R. at 635. 
 421. See Evans, Constitutional Property Rights, supra note 300, at 200. 
 422. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss whether property is better pro-
tected in these countries through constitutional judicial review or through political institu-
tions. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Daniel H. Cole, Political Institutions, 
Judicial Review, and Private Property: A Comparative Institutional Analysis, 15 SUP. CT. 
ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2007). 
